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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) is this nation’s 
overarching articulation of a national policy for environmental 
protection.1 NEPA has been characterized as having two primary 
aims: to force agencies to consider the environmental effects of their 
actions and to provide a means to involve and inform the public in 
federal agency decision-making.2 The primary action-forcing 
mechanism of NEPA is the requirement that agencies perform 
environmental impact analyses for major federal actions that may 
significantly affect the environment.3 According to this process, 
before a project is implemented, federal agencies must explore and 
document alternative approaches to the action and describe the 
potential environmental effects of each alternative.4 Agencies are also 
required to involve the public, both through a scoping process and by 
inviting comments on their analysis.5 
Cumulative Effects Analysis (CEA) is a required aspect of 
environmental impact analysis under NEPA.6 NEPA regulations, 
which were originally promulgated by the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) in 1978,7 define a cumulative effect as “the impact on 
the environment which results from the incremental impact of the 
action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
 
1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006). 
2 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) 
(establishing these as the two primary purposes of the Act). 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 4322 (2006) for general requirements of environmental impact 
analysis under NEPA and implementing regulations and see 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (2010) for 
detailed requirements. 
4 See generally 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (2010). 
5 See C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2010) and 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (2010). 
6 NEPA regulations define “effects” that must be analyzed in environmental impact 
statements: “Effects includes ecological . . . aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, 
or health, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2010). 40 C.F.R.    
§ 1508.25(c) directs agencies to consider in their environmental impact analyses three 
types of impacts: direct, indirect, and cumulative. 
7 The NEPA regulations at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2010) were first issued by CEQ in 
1978 and became effective in 1979. 
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future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or nonfederal) or 
person undertakes such other actions.”8 CEA is a critical aspect of 
NEPA analysis in that it requires federal agencies to look beyond the 
incremental impacts of a single decision, which may be individually 
insignificant but may cumulatively contribute to significant 
environmental change. 
The legislative history of NEPA’s passage indicates that 
cumulative impacts were always intended to be one of the central 
aspects of NEPA analysis.9 Regulations specifically emphasizing 
cumulative impacts were not written until 1978,10 but both early case 
law and guidelines from the CEQ emphasized the need for CEA.11 
Although CEA has been an issue raised in litigation for decades, in 
recent years environmental plaintiffs have brought an increasing 
number of complaints regarding CEA against the U.S. Forest Service 
(USFS) and have met with considerable success in court.12 In the 
Ninth Circuit, for example, the USFS has faced and lost more cases 
on CEA than any other public land agency.13 The requirement 
continues to be a controversial issue in National Forest management, 
and the judiciary is actively involved in defining the parameters of 
how CEA is implemented.14 
The purpose of this Article is to provide an overview of the origins 
of the requirement, explore how it relates to other similar 
requirements under NEPA, and analyze how it has been interpreted 
by agencies and courts. The Article begins in Part I with a look at the 
history of CEA and its place as part of NEPA analysis. I consider 
CEQ’s role in writing NEPA regulations and outlining the general 
 
8 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2010), 40 C.F. R. § 1508.8 (2010) define cumulative effects and 
cumulative impacts synonymously and the terms are used interchangeably throughout this 
article. 
9 See discussion infra at notes 33–40 and accompanying text. 
10 Supra note 7. 
11 See generally Terence L. Thatcher, Understanding Interdependence in the Natural 
Environment: Some Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 611 (1990). See 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (Aug. 1, 
1973). See Part II for discussion of early case law. 
12 See Michael D. Smith, Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act: An Analysis of Recent Case Law, 8 ENVTL. PRAC. 228 (2006) 
and discussion in Part III. 
13 Id. at 231. 
14 See Part III. 
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requirements of CEA. In Part II, I then discuss some important 
examples of how the judiciary interpreted the CEA requirement 
during the first three decades of NEPA implementation. The cases 
discussed are critical to understanding generally how agencies are 
required to approach CEA. In this section, I also explain how the 
requirement is similar but distinguishable from other NEPA concepts 
such as connected and cumulative actions.15 
The remainder of the Article is devoted to a review of all 
cumulative impacts case law from U.S. Circuit Courts involving the 
USFS over a period of twelve years (1998–2009). During this time 
the USFS saw a rise in challenges brought against it regarding the 
adequacy of its CEA.16 Part III analyzes these cases in detail, looking 
at the nature of the challenges and holdings by the federal appellate 
courts. The analysis is divided into sections according to the various 
types of CEA challenges in order to provide a sense of the major 
issues raised in court. For example, I consider CEA cases brought 
with regard to categorical exclusions, quality of scientific data, and 
scale of analysis. I conclude with a summary of observations 
regarding the landscape of case law on this complicated and important 
legal requirement. 
II 
HISTORY OF THE CEA REQUIREMENT 
One of the primary intents of NEPA was to alter agency decision-
making by forcing agencies to explicitly consider the environmental 
effects of their actions and explain their choices on the public record. 
As law professor Bradley Karkkainen explains, “[NEPA] seeks to 
improve environmental outcomes by forcing comprehensive 
disclosure of expected consequences of agency actions.”17 However, 
the Act does not require agencies to choose a more environmentally 
benign course of action, nor does it specify how agencies should 
respond to environmental risk. Early Supreme Court interpretations of 
NEPA made it clear that the Act’s requirement were primarily 
procedural and not substantive in nature.18 Despite language in 
 
15 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a); infra Part II.A. 
16 See Part III. 
17 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 903 (2002). 
18 See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); 
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989). 
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Section 101 of NEPA, which states that the purpose of the Act is to 
protect the environment, the Court ruled that those statements do not 
require a particular response from agencies.19 Agencies are obligated 
to consider, document, and analyze potential environmental effects 
but are not required to choose the most environmentally preferable 
course of action. 
NEPA, however, cannot be characterized as having a single intent 
and, in fact, incorporates a variety of goals. Some of the purposes 
behind NEPA include: clearer planning procedures, ecosystem-level 
analysis, exploration of alternatives in project design, increased 
transparency, judicial oversight, and opportunities for public 
participation.20 A thorough analysis of NEPA and its effects is beyond 
the scope of this project, but it is against this backdrop that we must 
understand the CEA requirement, as it is a key facet of the synoptic 
planning requirements of NEPA. 
A. The Authority of CEQ and Early NEPA Regulations 
The CEA requirement is found in the NEPA regulations 
promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in 
1978.21 These regulations guide agencies in their preparation of 
environmental impact statements and compliance with Section 102 of 
the Act.22 Sections 201–207 of NEPA outline the responsibilities of 
the CEQ, but nowhere in the act itself does it state that CEQ will 
interpret NEPA or promulgate regulations.23 Its responsibilities as 
outlined in the act are, in part, “to formulate and recommend national 
policies to promote the improvement of the quality of the 
environment.”24 CEQ’s job is to assist the President is his assessment 
of the state of the national environment and to generally guide and 
shape national environmental policy.25 
 
19 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006). 
20 See Paul J. Culhane, NEPA’s Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and 
Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L. 681 (1990). 
21 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2010); supra notes 7 and 8. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 4332 is commonly referred to as Section 102. 
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341–4347 (2006). 
24 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2006). 
25 See generally LYNTON K. CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE (1998). 
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Lynton Caldwell, one of the foremost scholars on NEPA and a 
principal architect of the Act itself, explains that CEQ was located in 
the Executive Office of the President in order to assist the president in 
fulfilling his managerial duties vis-à-vis the federal agencies.26 
Because NEPA was applicable to all federal agencies and its 
requirements cut across jurisdictional boundaries, CEQ would help to 
oversee and coordinate federal projects that would affect the 
environment. CEQ also was to fulfill “an interpretative or quasi-
adjudicative function” with regard to NEPA implementation and 
agency coordination.27 
The CEQ regulations were written in accordance with these 
interpretive responsibilities under NEPA. While the legislative history 
indicates there was concern that agencies would not know how to 
write environmental impact statements (EIS), no specific provisions 
were included in NEPA for regulations that would guide agency 
compliance with Section 102.28 In 1973, CEQ issued guidelines to 
assist in the completions of EISs,29 and eventually, in 1978, as 
authorized by President Carter through executive order,30 it issued 
regulations that provided clear requirements for EISs.31 Professor 
Lynton Caldwell explains that these regulations were meant to assist 
agencies in improving upon some of the “inexperienced fumbling 
attempts to meet the NEPA mandate” that were not uncommon during 
the first decade of NEPA compliance.32 
In summary, although the Act did not originally authorize CEQ to 
promulgate regulations, it was always assumed to be CEQ’s role to 
interpret aspects of the Act and coordinate activities across federal 
agencies. Given this coordinating role and the responsibility to 
promote a national environmental policy, it follows that CEQ was the 
appropriate body to take on the role of issuing regulations to clarify 
agency responsibilities under NEPA. The CEA requirement was made 
into formal administrative law with the writing of these regulations. 
 
26 Id. at 38. 
27 Id. at 39. 
28 Id. at 43. 
29 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (Aug. 1, 1973). 
30 Exec. Order No. 11,991 (1977). 
31 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2010). 
32 CALDWELL, supra note 25, at 44. 
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B. The CEA Requirement and its Derivation from NEPA 
Because the cumulative effects requirement is so broad, one might 
ask whether the requirement follows logically from the language of 
the Act itself. In order to gain perspective on this question, it is useful 
to step back for a moment and consider some background on NEPA. 
For a number of reasons, including the emphasis on the need for both 
a long-term perspective on environmental effects and coordination 
across federal, state, and private actors, the passage of NEPA was a 
monumental step in natural resource policy. As Senator Henry 
Jackson (D-Wash), NEPA’s primary sponsor in the Senate, put it, 
“[NEPA] . . . is in my judgment the most significant and important 
measure in the area of long-range domestic policymaking that will 
come before the 91st Congress. Without question, it is the most 
significant measure in the area of natural resource policy ever 
considered by the Congress.”33 
Indeed, the sweeping language of the Act gives testament to the 
grand vision of NEPA. The purpose of NEPA, as stated in the Act is: 
“To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and 
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment [and] to 
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere. . . .”34 And Section 101 of NEPA states: 
[I]t is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in 
cooperation with State and local governments, and other concerned 
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and 
measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man 
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, 
economic, and other requirements of present and future generations 
of Americans.35 
In the reports and debates that preceded NEPA’s passage, Congress 
repeatedly emphasized that, in the pursuit of short-term and economic 
goals, the people of the United States had caused serious harm to the 
environment.36 A Senate report from the Committee on Interior and 
 
33 115 CONG. REC. 19,008, 19,009 (1969). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006) (commonly referred to as Section 101). 
36 See e.g., S. REP. NO. 91-296, at 8–9 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 19,008 (1969), 115 
CONG. REC. 26,569 (1969); H.R. REP. NO. 91-378 (1969). Id. 
SCHULTZ 7/10/2012 9:23 AM 
132 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 27, 125 
Insular Affairs, which unanimously sponsored and supported NEPA, 
states: 
S. 1075 is also designed to deal with the long-range implications of 
the crucial environmental problems which have caused great public 
concern in recent years. The principle threats to the environment 
and the Nations’ life support system are those that man has himself 
induced in the pursuit of material wealth, greater productivity, and 
other important values. These threats . . . were not achieved 
intentionally. They were the spinoff, the fallout, and the 
unanticipated consequences which resulted from the pursuit of 
narrower, more immediate goals.37 
In this way, the legislative history of NEPA indicates Congress’s 
desire to improve upon the mistakes of the past by looking beyond 
incremental decision-making by independent government agencies to 
consider long-term and cumulative effects. As Senator Jackson 
explained in a 1969 Senate Committee report: 
As a result of [the] failure to formulate a comprehensive national 
policy, environmental decisionmaking largely continues to proceed 
as it has in the past. Policy is established by default and inaction. 
Environmental problems are only dealt with when they reach crisis 
proportions. . . . Important decisions . . . continue to be made in 
small but steady increments which perpetuate rather than avoid the 
recognized mistakes of previous decades.38 
Part of the intent of NEPA, then, was to force federal agencies to 
look beyond the immediate effects of their projects and their own 
jurisdictional boundaries and provide a larger-scale analysis of their 
contribution to the state of the environment. Debate in the House in 
particular emphasized the need for coordination across federal 
agencies and consideration of the activities by state, local, and private 
entities.39 Members of the House described the need for in-depth and 
broad-scale study of the ecological effects of projects over both the 
long and short term.40 Such comments focused primarily on the 
 
37 S. REP. NO. 91-296 (1969). This report is also published in full at: 115 CONG. REC. 
19,008 (1969) as part of a Senate floor debate on bill S. 1075. 
38 Id. at 5. 
39 See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 26,569, 26,574 (1969) (statement of Rep. Thomas Pelly 
(R-Wash) in a House debate on NEPA). Pelly stated that current institutions “cannot 
accomplish the task of coordinating the activities and often conflicting interests of our 
Federal agencies, State and local governments, and private industry.” 
40 See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 26569, 26584 (1969) (statement of Rep. Robert Leggett 
(D-CA) in the House debate on NEPA). Leggett explained, “When a Federal project, such 
as the Peripheral canal project, irreversibly changes the ecology of a vast region there 
needs to be in depth study of the total environmental effects of such a program.” He also  
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importance of an agency like CEQ, which, once established, guided 
the agencies to participate in the consideration of long-term effects 
across jurisdictions. 
The notion of CEA also follows from other language in the Act 
itself. Under Section 102 of NEPA, agencies must report on “the 
environmental impact of the proposed action” and “any adverse 
environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented.”41 The Act also specifies that the EIS should discuss 
“the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.”42 It 
is implied that the scope of an EIS is meant not only to consider the 
immediate effects of a project but also how it might impact the 
environment in the long-term through indirect or cumulative effects 
with other projects. 
The precise terminology of “cumulative impacts” is not found in 
the legislative hearings that preceded NEPA’s passage. However, the 
cumulative effects requirement represents some of the core goals of 
NEPA: to consider long-term environmental effects, to look beyond 
incremental decision-making, and to consider the effects of the 
actions of multiple actors. When seen in concert with the sweeping 
environmental goals articulated in the statement of purpose and 
Section 101 of NEPA, the language in Section 102, and the legislative 
history of NEPA, CEA is a logical interpretation of the Act itself. 
Furthermore, the CEA requirement was a codification of NEPA 
common law that had been established during the 1970s, as is 
discussed further in Part II; CEQ guidelines also emphasized the 
importance of cumulative impacts as early as 1973.43 Therefore, when 
the CEA requirement was included in the 1978 regulations, it was 
nothing new or novel. 
C. What the CEA Requirement Entails 
CEQ regulations require the consideration of three kinds of 
impacts: direct, which happen at the same place and time as the 
 
stated, “[t]here is a definite need for a consistent and expert source of review of national 
policies, environmental problems and trends, both long and short term.” 
41 42 U.S.C.§ 4332(C)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
42 42 U.S.C.§ 4332(C)(iv) (2006). 
43 See generally Thatcher, supra note 11. 
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project; indirect, which result from the project but occur at a more 
distant place and/or time; and cumulative.44 The regulations further 
recommend that agencies analyze proposed projects that could be 
considered “cumulative actions” in concert and include analyses of 
these projects in the same EIS.45 The message from CEQ is 
consistent: agencies should analyze the effects of their projects, not 
only in isolation, but also with a look at their cumulative effects with 
other activities. 
Despite the consistent message as to the importance of CEA, there 
has been a considerable lack of understanding and compliance with 
regard to the cumulative impacts requirement. For example, studies 
conducted in the mid and late nineties indicated that less than half of 
the environmental assessments (EA) reviewed contained any 
cumulative impacts analysis.46 Those that did contain a section on 
CEA sometimes concluded that there were no cumulative impacts 
from the proposed actions without providing supporting evidence or 
analysis.47 Professor Michael Smith writes, “In the 15-year period 
following the release of the 1979 version of the CEQ Regulations, 
cumulative impact analyses were often ignored or given very little 
attention in many agency NEPA documents, and court cases 
challenging cumulative impact analyses became increasingly 
common.”48 He goes on to explain that during the nineties, “[a] 
general consensus emerged that there was a lack of a clear definition 
of exactly what a cumulative impact analysis was supposed to cover, 
along with proper procedures to follow in preparing one.”49 
In response to this confusion, CEQ published a handbook to 
cumulative effects analysis entitled “Considering Cumulative Effects 
 
44 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c) (2010). 
45 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2010). The difference between cumulative effects and 
cumulative actions is explained in more detail in Part II. 
46 See Lance N. McCold & Jeremy Holman, Cumulative Impacts in Environmental 
Assessments: How Well Are They Assessed, 17 ENVTL. PROF’L. 1 (1995); R.K. Burris & 
Larry W. Canter, Cumulative Impacts Are Not Properly Addressed in Environmental 
Assessments, 17 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 5 (1997). Both of these studies 
evaluated environmental assessments or EAs, which are a type of environmental impact 
assessment done under NEPA for projects that will not have significant environmental 
impacts. See 36 C.F.R. § 1502.3. If projects will have significant environmental impacts, 
the more detailed environmental impact statement is required. Id. 
47 See Burris & Canter, supra note 46, at 16. 
48 See Smith, supra note 12, at 229. 
49 Id. 
SCHULTZ 7/10/2012 9:23 AM 
2012] History of the Cumulative Effects Analysis 135 
Requirement Under NEPA and Its Interpretation in 
U.S. Forest Service Case Law 
Under the National Environmental Policy Act” in 1997.50 This 
handbook does not have the force of law but is often referred to as the 
primary guide for federal agencies in their preparation of cumulative 
impacts analyses. CEQ emphasizes that CEA is a crucial aspect of 
environmental impact analysis and one that has only become more 
important over time. The handbook elaborates on this point and 
states: 
Evidence is increasing that the most devastating environmental 
effects may result not from the direct effects of particular actions, 
but from the combination of individually minor effects of multiple 
actions over time. . . . The fact that the human environment 
continues to change in unintended and unwanted ways in spite of 
improved federal decisionmaking resulting from the implementation 
of NEPA is largely attributable to this incremental (cumulative) 
impact.51 
In these statements the CEQ handbook echoes the concerns of 
Congress in enacting NEPA and emphasizes the continued 
importance of CEA analysis for meaningful NEPA compliance. The 
most difficult aspect of CEA, the handbook goes on to explain, is 
defining the scope of the analysis. If it is too large, the CEA analysis 
will become unwieldy; if it is too small, the analysis will miss 
important considerations.52 The CEQ handbook discusses the 
importance of considering each resource in turn at the appropriate 
scale and focusing on effects that are “meaningful” (defined by 
whether the effects are of interest to affected parties).53 It also 
acknowledges that effects will almost always have to be considered 
beyond political and administrative boundaries.54 Clearly, the NEPA 
practitioner has her hands full; she has to figure out what effects are 
meaningful and worthy of analysis, what is the relevant scale of 
analysis for each resource (and the scale might be different for every 
resource), and facilitate the completion of an analysis that will require 
 
50 COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER THE 
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997), available at ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa 
/ccenepa/ccenepa.htm. 
51 Id.at 1. 
52 Id. at v. 
53 Id. at 11. 
54 Id. at 12. 
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data and information from numerous sources, potentially across many 
jurisdictional boundaries. 
One thing about CEA is clear: it poses a challenging task. The 
CEQ handbook provides an list of activities that would have to be 
considered for a CEA for a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
mining project, and no fewer than twenty-six public projects 
involving four agencies and twelve environmental issues are listed as 
relevant.55 If this degree of analysis is required to fulfill obligations 
under NEPA, we might assume that this sort of big-picture analysis 
would be handled or assisted by a programmatic EIS.56 However, this 
is not always the case, because CEA is often reserved for the project-
level analysis when the nature of actual activities is more clearly 
defined.57 
CEQ offers some consolation to the NEPA practitioner, explaining 
that she should “focus on important cumulative issues, recognizing 
that a better decision, rather than a perfect cumulative effects analysis, 
is the goal.”58 In other words, an important question is whether 
additional analysis will inform the alternatives analysis and help the 
decision-maker with the decision at hand. A CEA is not necessarily 
about providing a perfect analysis for each resource. Also, it is critical 
to recognize that NEPA imposes no requirement to generate new 
information, although reasonable attempts should be made to acquire 
important information; the nature and importance of information gaps 
must also be explained.59 However, if the information needed for a 
cumulative effects analysis is not available, planners do not have to 
design scientific models or conduct new research. 
Despite the publication of the CEQ handbook, there still exists 
considerable confusion as to how to conduct a cumulative impacts 
analysis.60 One study reports that in a recent survey of NEPA 
 
55 Id. at 28. 
56 By a “programmatic EIS” I mean one that would cover multiple projects or actions. 
This sort of EIS might accompany a regional planning effort, such as a BLM resource 
management plan or USFS forest plan. Other programmatic EISs include those that would 
accompany a forest-wide travel management plan or a region-wide species management 
strategy. 
57 See generally Lance N. McCold & James W. Saulsbury, Including Past and Present 
Impacts in Cumulative Impact Assessments, 20 ENVTL. MGMT. 767 (1996). 
58 See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 50, at vii. 
59 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2012) (explaining what is required of agencies in cases of 
incomplete or unavailable information). 
60 See Smith, supra note 12, at 229. 
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practitioners, cumulative impacts analysis was identified as one of the 
most critical areas where more training is necessary.61 Several authors 
have indicated that CEA case law sends mixed signals and that the 
courts do not always enforce all aspects of the CEA requirement, 
although this is to be expected to some extent given that courts make 
decisions based on the specific facts of particular cases.62 At this point 
we can turn to the case law to get a sense of how the requirement has 
been interpreted by the courts. 
III 
AN OVERVIEW OF EARLY CEA AND CEA-RELEVANT CASE LAW 
Cumulative effects analysis has been an aspect of NEPA 
implementation since the early 1970s, and federal courts have 
required that agencies perform CEA since as early as 1975.63 This 
section considers important examples of CEA case law from the 
1970s through the early 1990s and also explores how the courts have 
ruled on related requirements under NEPA. 
A. Cumulative Actions, Connected Actions, and Cumulative Effects 
In the years after NEPA’s passage, common law played a 
significant role in fleshing out the requirements of the Act. In 1976, in 
one of the most important, early NEPA cases, Supreme Court Justice 
Marshall wrote, “[T]his vaguely worded statute seems designed to 
serve as no more than a catalyst for development of a ‘common law’ 
of NEPA. [T]he courts . . . have created such a ‘common law.’ 
Indeed, that development is the source of NEPA’s success.”64 When 
CEQ promulgated formal NEPA regulations in 1978, those 
regulations generally reflected the trends from NEPA common law up 
until that point.65 Therefore, it is useful to look at early NEPA case 
 
61 Id. at 229 (citing Robert Smythe & Caroline Isber, NEPA in the Agencies: A Critique 
of Current Practices, 5 ENVTL. PRAC. 290 (2003)). 
62 See Thatcher, supra note 11; CALDWELL, supra note 25; Laura Hartt, Recent Case, 
Pacific Coast Federation of Fisherman’s Associations v. NMFS: A Case Study on 
Successes and Failures in Challenging Logging Activities with Adverse Cumulative Effects 
on Fish and Wildlife, 32 ENVTL. L. 671 (2002). 
63 See Natural Res. Def. Council, infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
64 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
65 See generally Thatcher, supra note 11. 
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law, which provides the foundation for how the CEA requirement has 
been interpreted. 
There are a number of requirements under NEPA that force 
agencies to consider environmental effects from multiple projects in 
concert. One of these, of course, is the CEA requirement. However, 
cumulative actions66 and connected actions67 requirements also 
demand an evaluation of effects beyond the level of a single project. 
In many cases, even today, courts deal with the question of which of 
these requirements is triggered. Is the issue at hand one of connected 
or cumulative actions, in which case a single programmatic EIS is 
required? Or is this a case requiring analysis of cumulative effects of 
multiple projects, for which a programmatic EIS is not necessarily 
required? These regulatory requirements are closely related and get at 
the same underlying goal of inter-project analysis. For this reason, 
and because some of the relevant legal standards are applicable across 
these different requirements, a brief review of the case law on all 
three issues is necessary. 
The first cumulative effects case heard by a federal appellate court 
was Natural Resource Defense Council v. Callaway,68 which involved 
an Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) proposal to dump waste off the 
coast of Connecticut.69 The Corps conducted its EIS as if its project 
could be analyzed in isolation, despite the existence of several other 
pending proposals for projects by other entities, both private and 
public, that would dump waste at or near the same site. The court 
required that the Navy and the Corps consider the impact of the 
proposal when seen in concert with similar proposals and actions by 
other parties.70 In essence, the court required a cumulative effects 
analysis. The decision was based in large part on the legislative 
history of NEPA and “pushed NEPA law in a new but logical 
direction.”71 The requirements set forth by the court are now accepted 
as basic CEA practice by today’s standards. At the time, however, the 
 
66 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2012). Cumulative actions are those that “when viewed 
with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts and should therefore be 
discussed in the same impact statement.” Id. 
67 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2012). Connected actions are actions that “are closely 
related and therefore should be discussed in the same impact statement.” Id. 
68 524 F.2d 79 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
69 Id. at 82. 
70 Id. at 89–90. 
71 Thatcher, supra note 11, at 614. 
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decision sent an important message that CEA must be included in 
environmental impact analyses. 
A year later, an important and still oft-cited NEPA case, Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club,72 was decided; it dealt with the question of cumulative 
actions.73 At issue in this case was a decision by the U.S. Department 
of the Interior not to prepare a programmatic EIS for coal-related 
projects in the Northern Great Plains region.74 The plaintiffs 
contended that the projects should have been considered cumulative 
actions, which are described in the regulations as actions that “when 
viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant 
impacts and should therefore be discussed in the same impact 
statement.”75 However, the U.S. government argued that the other 
projects had not been formally proposed and were not part of a single, 
comprehensive coal-development strategy. The U.S. Supreme Court 
sided with the government, ruling that agencies are only required to 
prepare a programmatic EIS when multiple proposals are pending 
review for the same region and could be considered cumulative 
actions.76 Importantly, according to the decision in Kleppe, these 
actions must have ripened into actual proposals for a programmatic 
EIS to be required.77 Additionally, the agency is entitled to deference 
in deciding how the region is defined, what projects are included in a 
programmatic EIS,78 and when the EIS is undertaken.79 
While Kleppe speaks to the analysis of cumulative actions under 
NEPA, it does not specifically address the analysis of cumulative 
effects. Again, these are two different concepts in the CEQ 
regulations, although they clearly share the goals of inter-project and 
regional analysis. We can understand this distinction more clearly by 
looking at the Sierra Club’s claims in Kleppe. The Sierra Club was 
 
72 427 U.S. 390 (1976). 
73 See generally id. 
74 Id. 
75 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (2012). 
76 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 414–15. 
77 Id. at 401. See also id. at 415 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing how this decision 
limits the impact of NEPA). By not requiring work on an EIS before a formal proposal is 
made, argued Marshall, the Court seriously limited the effects of NEPA, which was meant 
to inform agencies in the course of developing a proposal. Id. at 421. 
78 Id. at 414. 
79 Id. at n.26. 
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interested in forcing the agencies to conduct a region-wide analysis of 
the effects of coal development in the region. Legally, there were two 
ways the Sierra Club could have approached this problem. The Sierra 
Club’s approach was to challenge the decision not to prepare a 
programmatic EIS. Because the Court decided that only actual 
proposals must be considered in a programmatic EIS, and there was 
no pending proposal for a regional coal-leasing program, the Sierra 
Club lost the argument for a programmatic EIS. 
Another tactic would have been to challenge the adequacy of the 
cumulative effects analysis in a single EIS. The Court explained this 
in Kleppe, writing that the Sierra Club’s claims could have been 
understood as “an attack on the sufficiency of the impact statements 
already prepared . . . on the coal-related projects that [the agencies] 
have approved. . . .”80 However, the Court goes on to explain that it 
cannot consider the adequacy of any EIS as “the case was not brought 
as a challenge to a particular impact statement. . . .”81 Thus, this case 
did not directly address cumulative impacts analysis in a single EIS 
but, instead, addressed the issue of cumulative actions. 
In other words, cumulative effects analysis requires the 
consideration of the effects of multiple projects in concert in an 
individual EIS, even if a single programmatic EIS is not required for 
those actions.82 CEA is also not limited to proposed actions, as are 
requirements to analyze cumulative actions together, but may include 
other reasonably foreseeable actions. In summary, because a court has 
limited power to require a cumulative impacts analysis in the shape of 
a programmatic EIS, cumulative impacts analysis in a single EIS is 
one place where agencies can be legally required to look at the broad-
scale impacts of their actions in concert with foreseeable future 
actions that have not yet ripened into formal proposals. 
 
80 Id. at 408. 
81 Id. 
82 Thatcher, supra note 11, at 624–25 (quoting Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 
832 F.2d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987) as clarification). 
The “cumulative impact” regulation requires the Corps to evaluate “the incremental 
impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. Although the CEQ guidelines require that 
“cumulative actions” be considered together in a single EIS, 40 C.F.R. § 
1508.25(a)(2), and “cumulative actions” consist only of “proposed actions,” this 
does not negate the requirement of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 that the Corps consider 
cumulative impacts of the proposed actions which supplement or aggravate the 
impacts of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions. 
Id. 
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The decision in Kleppe left open the question of to what extent an 
agency could go forward with several projects that might be part of a 
larger set of cumulative actions. In Connor v. Burford, the court dealt 
with precisely this issue.83 In that case the court required the BLM 
and USFS to prepare an EIS on oil and gas leases in the Flathead and 
Gallatin National Forests. All of the leases were approved at the same 
time, although the lessees had not yet developed site-specific 
proposals. The court reasoned that the agencies could not approve 
some leases and prepare an EIS later because the agencies might miss 
the point where cumulative impacts became significant.84 Although 
the Supreme Court stated that courts would defer to an agency’s 
discretion in deciding the timing of a cumulative actions EIS, the 
court in this case found that the agency’s failure to undertake such an 
analysis prior to any action was unjustifiable. This case illustrates the 
difficulty in understanding, in terms of legal requirements, exactly 
when a planned action might be considered a formal proposal and at 
what point the cumulative actions requirement might be triggered. 
There is no hard and fast rule as to when a programmatic EIS is 
required, and courts will rule differently on this matter depending on 
the specifics of the case at hand. 
Also related to CEA is the idea of connected actions. When 
multiple projects are connected, an agency must analyze the 
cumulative effects of those projects in a single EIS, even if not all of 
the connected actions have ripened into obvious proposals.85 The 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Thomas v. Peterson is a classic example of a 
case of connected actions. 86 In this case, the USFS prepared an EA on 
a road that would be used for timber harvest. The agency analyzed the 
effects of the road in isolation, concluding that it would have no 
significant impact, and did not include the effects of the planned 
timber sale in the EA. The court ruled that the agency could not 
analyze the effects of a road built for timber sale without also 
 
83 Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). 
84 Id. at 1451. 
85 Connected actions are defined in CEQ regulations as actions which “(i) 
[a]utomatically trigger other actions which may require environmental impact 
statements[;] (ii) [c]annot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously or 
simultaneously[;] (iii) [a]re interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger 
action for their justification.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(i)–(iii) (2010). 
86 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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considering the effects of the timber sale at the same time, since the 
actions were clearly connected.87 Courts generally use the 
“independent utility” test to determine whether separate actions 
should be consider connected.88 If a single action does not necessarily 
trigger another and has a utility apart from another action, a court will 
not consider the two actions connected.89 The analysis of connected 
actions is another way courts can require the analysis of cumulative 
effects of multiple but interdependent projects. 
B. CEA-Specific Case Law in the 1980s and Early 1990s 
In the decades after NEPA’s passage, the appellate courts decided a 
number of cases that established CEA as a clearly enforceable 
requirement in NEPA analyses. Recall that in 1975 the Second Circuit 
made clear that CEA was a binding requirement in Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Callaway.90 A Fifth Circuit decision, Fritiofson v. 
Alexander, dealt with an Army Corps of Engineers’ EA for the 
approval of a permit to fill a portion of a wetland on Galveston Island 
in Texas.91 The loss of the wetland from the permit area alone was not 
considered biologically significant, but when seen in concert with 
foreseeable broader scale development on the island, it implicated 
more significant effects. The court held that the Corps must analyze 
the cumulative effects of its actions in concert with reasonably 
foreseeable future actions involving wetland development, even when 
future actions had not ripened into specific proposals.92 
Other appellate court cases sent a similar message to the agencies 
regarding the CEA requirement. In LaFlamme v. FERC, the Ninth 
Circuit required that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
assess the cumulative impacts of all proposed and existing projects in 
a watershed and ruled that it was insufficient to consider the effects of 
single projects in isolation.93 In an early challenge to the geographic 
scale of a CEA, the D.C. Circuit ruled in National Resources Defense 
Council v. Hodel that Interior was required to consider cumulative 
impacts to migratory whale and fish species resulting from multiple 
 
87 Id. at 759. 
88 Id. at 759–60. 
89 See, e.g., Native Ecosystem Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2002). 
90 524 F.2d. 79 (2nd Cir. 1975). 
91 772 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1985). 
92 Id. at 1246. 
93 852 F.2d 389, 402 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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off-shore oil and gas projects in both the Pacific and Alaskan 
regions.94 Cases such as these, involving effects to a target resource 
(such as a specific species) or effects to a distinct geographic area, 
have generally been more compelling to reviewing courts than more 
general “bigger is worse” claims in terms of cumulative effects 
challenges.95 
In City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, which dealt with a timber 
sale contract in the Tongass National Forest, the court addressed 
several aspects of the CEA requirement.96 First, it held that the agency 
was required to analyze cumulative effects of the current proposed 
sales in concert with reasonably foreseeable future sales (in this case 
these sales had already been announced by the agency through 
published notices of intent).97 The agency also could not disaggregate 
its analysis area-by-area to avoid considering cumulative impacts.98 
In response to the court’s clear requirement of a CEA, the USFS 
explained that it had already analyzed cumulative impacts in its 1979 
land management plan.99 The court found this argument disingenuous 
for several reasons.100 The agency then tried to argue that it would 
perform a CEA in the upcoming revision of the forest plan.101 
However, the court held that NEPA clearly requires an analysis of 
effects before a planned action is undertaken.102 Therefore, the agency 
could not wait to conduct its CEA in an upcoming plan revision. The 
court concluded that the lack of CEA in the EIS under review could 
not be justified without consideration of other current and foreseeable 
projects, nor could the CEA in the forest plan EIS substitute for 
analysis at the project level.103 
 
94 865 F.2d 288, 298–99 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
95 See generally Thatcher, supra note 11. 
96 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990). 
97 Id. at 1312. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1313. 
100 Id. For one, the agency was required to analyze cumulative impacts on subsistence 
users, in accordance with the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 
which was passed after the forest plan was completed. Secondly, the court found the forest 
plan EIS to be quite general with no site-specific analysis of the timber harvesting projects 
at issue. Id. at 1309, 1313. 
101 Id. at 1313. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1313–14. 
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The agency’s arguments in Tenakee Springs are a good example of 
what several authors have referred to as a “shell-game,” by which an 
agency justifies a lack of NEPA analysis in one document by 
suggesting that it will be or has been done in another NEPA 
document.104 For example, in justifying the absence of CEA in a 
project-level EIS, an agency might claim that it has either already 
analyzed cumulative impacts at the plan level or that it will do so in 
an upcoming plan. Alternatively, an agency might defend a lack of 
cumulative effects analysis in a programmatic EIS by explaining that 
it will conduct the CEA at the project level. But when pushed at the 
project level, the USFS may claim that certain types of analyses are 
beyond the scope of project level analyses. As we will see, an agency 
does have some leeway to decide the appropriate timing of a CEA. 
However, courts have not been blindly deferential in this area and 
generally require some sort of CEA at both the programmatic and 
project levels.105 
An important Ninth Circuit case from the early 1990s that dealt 
with the CEA issue at the plan level was Resources Limited, Inc. v. 
Robertson, in which the plaintiffs challenged the Flathead Forest Plan 
EIS.106 The plaintiffs argued that the agency should have analyzed the 
effects of nonfederal actions as part of the plan’s CEA, but the agency 
responded that it did not need to analyze nonfederal actions because 
such actions are out of the agency’s control. The court made it clear 
that any EIS, including those for forest plans, must include a CEA, 
and that to exclude nonfederal actions from a CEA is contrary to the 
plain meaning of NEPA regulations.107 However, the court also 
acknowledged that not all aspects of a CEA must occur at the 
programmatic level.108 It held in this case that the agency did not have 
to analyze nonfederal cumulative impacts “on the condition that the 
Forest Service must analyze such impacts, including possible 
synergistic effects from implementation of the Plan as a whole, before 
specific sales.”109 Given the facts of this case, the court decided that 
 
104 See generally Joseph M. Feller, ‘Til the Cows Come Home: The Fatal Flaw in the 
Clinton Administration’s Public Lands Grazing Policy, 25 ENVTL. L. 703 (1995); Martin 
Nie, Governing the Tongass: National Forest Conflict and Political Decision Making, 36 
ENVTL. L. 385 (2006). 
105 See infra notes 106–10 and accompanying text, along with analysis in Part III. 
106 35 F.3d 1300 (1993). 
107 Id. at 1306. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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the best time to analyze cumulative impacts of activities on 
nonfederal lands would be at the project level. Nonetheless, this case 
is sometimes cited in reference to the requirement for CEA in a forest 
plan EIS.110 
Based on the first two decades of CEA case law, by the early 1990s 
the CEA requirement under NEPA had been established as a legally 
enforceable requirement.111 It had been established that agencies were 
required to analyze similar actions in close proximity, foreseeable 
future actions, and in some cases even nonfederal actions outside of 
their control.112 Agencies were advised to be particularly careful not 
to improperly segment connected actions or ignore similar actions in 
the same region that are under the agency’s control.113 
C. Recent CEA-Case Law in the Ninth Circuit 
A review of Ninth Circuit CEA case law from 1995 to 2004 found 
that the number of cases involving federal agencies and CEA 
challenges has been on the rise in recent years.114 In Michael Smith’s 
2006 article on CEA case law in the Ninth Circuit, he found that the 
majority of these cases involved the USFS, which lost sixty-nine 
percent of the published cases decided by the Ninth Circuit over a ten-
year period.115 Smith explained that the most common challenge to 
CEAs—and the most common reason agencies lost in court—was an 
inadequate analysis of past, present and reasonably foreseeable future 
projects; agencies also lost a number of cases because their CEAs 
lacked supporting data or rationale.116 
Despite the agencies’ losing record, however, Smith concluded that 
courts do not expect the impossible: 
[I]n nearly all cases [the agencies] are not losing these court cases 
because their cumulative impact analyses are not perfect, but rather 
because they either have no cumulative impact analysis at all in 
 
110 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
111 See generally Albert I. Herson & Kenneth M. Bogdan, Cumulative Impact Analysis 
Under NEPA: Recent Legal Developments, 13 ENVTL. PROF’L 100 (1991). 
112 Id. at 106. 
113 Id. 
114 See Smith, supra note 12, at 230. 
115 Id. at 231. 
116 Id. at 228. 
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their NEPA document; they leave out obvious or critically 
important other past, present, and especially reasonably 
foreseeable future projects in their analysis area, or the analysis 
consists solely of undocumented assertions/conclusions of no 
impacts without any supporting analysis or rationale to back up 
that claim.117 
Agencies must document other relevant projects in their CEAs; 
support their claims with data and reasoned analysis; make a good 
faith attempt to comply with NEPA, but also know that the court does 
not expect perfection; and be careful not to tier to non-NEPA 
documents or programmatic EISs with no site-specific information.118 
Smith concludes that there is little evidence that the court is pushing 
the requirements of NEPA in new directions or requiring more than 
was intended by Congress and CEQ, although he suggests that Lands 
Council v. Powell, a case from 2004 discussed in further detail below, 
may be an exception.119 
One issue to consider is whether CEA challenges have been on the 
rise in the Ninth Circuit because the court has become relatively more 
sympathetic to plaintiffs on this issue over the years. There is some 
indication that the court in the CEA cases from 1998 was relatively 
more favorable toward plaintiffs challenging timber sales. In her 
analysis of Ninth Circuit case law involving timber sales in the 1990s, 
Susan Jane Brown wrote that the court, in Neighbors of Cuddy 
Mountain v. United States Forest Service (hereinafter Neighbors I),120 
Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas,121 and Blue Mountains 
Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood (hereinafter Blue Mountains),122 
engaged in particularly factual and meaningful review of the basis of 
USFS decisions.123 In cases prior to 1998, Brown explained, the Ninth 
Circuit failed in a number of cases to closely examine the details of 
agency decisions and essentially denied plaintiffs any meaningful 
judicial review of the issues raised; the court’s more careful review in 
Neighbors I and Blue Mountains, she argued, “represent[s] the proper 
 
117 Id. at 238 (emphasis in original). 
118 Id. at 238–39. 
119 Id. at 239. 
120 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998). 
121 137 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 1998). 
122 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998). 
123 Susan Jane M. Brown, Striking the Balance: The Tale of Eight Ninth Circuit Timber 
Sales Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. 639 (1999). 
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application of the arbitrary and capricious standard.”124 She argued 
that in Neighbors I and Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, “[T]he 
court did not unquestioningly resort to deference to agency decision 
making, but instead looked at the facts alleged to support the Forest 
Service’s conclusions. This is factually informed judicial decision 
making, which properly balances the agency’s hard look burden and 
discretion with the prerequisites of the law.”125 In Brown’s view these 
cases represented something of a judicial course correction away from 
cases in previous years where the Ninth Circuit had been overly 
deferential. 
As discussed earlier, prior to 1998 the Ninth Circuit had 
established the CEA as an enforceable requirement of NEPA. 
However, as Brown argues, the 1998 decisions signaled that the level 
of scrutiny applied to agency decisions might be significantly 
ratcheted up in the future. Considering that all three of those cases 
dealt with CEA challenges and that the analysis was ruled inadequate 
in all cases, setting important precedent in terms of CEA standards, it 
is possible that the Ninth Circuit post-1998 became a more favorable 
environment for plaintiffs bringing CEA challenges against the USFS. 
IV 
CEA CASE LAW FROM 1998 TO 2009 INVOLVING THE USFS: SIX 
KEY ISSUES 
This analysis considers CEA case law for a twelve-year period 
(1998–2009), with a specific focus on USFS case law and a look at all 
federal appellate courts. Circuit court cases were chosen to limit the 
scope of the analysis and because appeals court cases “usually end up 
being the final word on most NEPA issues.”126 The Supreme Court 
hears very few NEPA cases, leaving the circuit courts to flesh out the 
details of NEPA compliance.127 This review focuses on the Forest 
Service because it is the agency that faces the most challenges on its 
CEAs.128 
 
124 Id. at 681. 
125 Id. at 661. 
126 Smith, supra note 12, at 229. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 231. 
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Cases were identified for the years 1998 to 2009 by searching both 
Lexis-Nexis and WestLaw for cases containing the phrases 
“cumulative impacts” or “cumulative effects” and in which the USFS 
was a primary defendant.129 Only published opinions and those 
involving CEA challenges under NEPA were included in the sample. 
The search yielded twenty-two cases for the twelve-year period, with 
nineteen in the Ninth Circuit, three in the Tenth Circuit, and no 
published opinions on CEAs from any other circuit court. The three 
Tenth Circuit cases are from 2006 and 2007 only. In the Ninth 
Circuit, cases were identified in all years except 2001 and 2002, and 
there was no discernable trend in the number of cases involving CEA 
and the USFS over the analysis period. The agency faced anywhere 
from zero to three challenges per year, with an average of one and a 
half cases per year over the ten-year period. Tables 1 and 2, included 
at the end of this article, provide an overview of the cases analyzed by 
year along with the court’s decision on the CEA challenge. 
In the CEA cases identified in the Ninth Circuit, the USFS lost 
thirteen of the nineteen challenges brought with regard to the 
adequacy of a CEA, giving the agency a thirty-two percent success 
rate. The USFS won all of the challenges in the Tenth Circuit. The 
most common challenge, and the most common reason the agency 
lost, was a failure to include in the CEA an adequate analysis of 
relevant past, present, and/or reasonably foreseeable future projects in 
the area.130 In other words, the agency often lost CEA challenges 
because of a failure to adequately analyze the effects of past projects, 
other concurrent projects that the court ruled should have been part of 
the CEA, or cumulative impacts in light of proposed or foreseeable 
future projects. 
Rather than cover in detail all twenty-two cases analyzed in this 
study, this section considers cases in sections according to the major 
types of CEA challenges. This approach allows for a broad look at the 
lessons to be taken from recent CEA case law involving the USFS. In 
the following sections, I discuss the primary CEA issues that have 
been raised in court in order to provide an overview of the types of 
 
129 One case with the words “cumulative effects” in the decision was excluded from the 
sample: in Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1999), CEA was not a 
primary challenge raised in this case but instead just one of numerous complaints about the 
general inadequacy of the EIS. 
130 Of the nineteen cases on CEA in the Ninth Circuit, eleven involved challenges on 
this issue. See discussion infra at Part III.B. and Table 1. The agency lost eight of those 
eleven cases. Id. 
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CEA challenges and a sense of how the courts have ruled on these 
topics. Two of the most common challenges raised involve the lack of 
supporting detail or decision rationale in a CEA and the failure to 
sufficiently analyze the effects of other past, present, or reasonably 
foreseeable actions as part of a CEA. Other issues discussed herein 
include: problems with the science behind a CEA; challenges to the 
chosen scale of analysis; the issue of tiering CEA to another 
document or postponing it until a later analysis;131 and CEAs for 
projects that are implemented under a Categorical Exclusion (CatEx) 
under NEPA. The primary goals of the analysis are to provide insight 
into the different types of CEA complaints that plaintiffs have raised 
in court and to look at the factors that contribute to whether a CEA is 
deemed adequate. The details of all cases are covered in Tables 1 and 
2. 
A. Issue 1: Lack of Detail or Clear Rationale 
The first Ninth Circuit case included in this analysis serves as a 
useful jumping off point for considering CEA challenges. In 
Neighbors I, the plaintiffs challenged the EIS for a timber sale in the 
Payette National Forest in Idaho.132 They charged that the USFS’ 
analysis of cumulative effects on old-growth habitat lacked detail, 
and, in particular, failed to analyze in any detail three other 
reasonably foreseeable sales slated to occur in the same roadless area 
known as Cuddy Mountain.133 In exploring the potential effects of this 
sale and others on old-growth habitat and dependent species, the CEA 
included statements such as: “There is some risk that the remaining 
mature and old growth forests on Cuddy Mountain may not be 
adequate in size, if isolated from adjacent suitable habitat, to maintain 
the dependent species.”134 The EIS also stated that monitoring should 
 
131 See 40 C.F.R. 1502.20 (discussing tiering, a process whereby agencies may 
reference in NEPA documents analysis that has already been conducted in a former NEPA 
document). Tiering is often used for project-level NEPA analysis when the project is done 
as part of a broader program and policy, for which a broader programmatic NEPA analysis 
was previously conducted. Id. 
132 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Neighbors I]. 
133 Id. at 1378. 
134 Id. at 1379 (citing the USFS’s 1994 Grade/Dukes EIS). 
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be done in order to have the information necessary to assess 
cumulative impacts on old-growth dependent species.135 
As for the other proposed sales in the area, the agency included no 
detail about the amount of old-growth that would be cut in each of the 
proposed sales or whether any of the sales would impact the same 
home ranges of pileated woodpeckers, an old-growth management 
indicator species (so designated by the USFS). The court explained, 
“The sole reference to future sales stated, ‘Future timber sales over 
the next several years would propose to treat additional old-growth 
habitat.’”136 This statement suffers from a common shortcoming in 
many of the CEAs that are deemed inadequate: it describes actions, in 
this case in very general terms, rather than analyzing effects to a 
particular resource, such as old-growth dependent species and their 
habitat. In other words, the agency discloses the fact that additional 
old-growth habitat will be treated, but does not then translate that in 
terms of how it will actually affect wildlife populations. 
As a whole, the CEA lacked any quantified or detailed information, 
without which, the court explained, “[N]either the courts nor the 
public, in reviewing the Forest Service’s decisions, can be assured 
that the Forest Service provided the hard look that it is required to 
provide.”137 Both NEPA and National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA) planning regulations in effect at the time, according to the 
court, required more detailed information about effects on habitat 
resulting from multiple projects in the same area.138 All of the projects 
had been formally proposed and thus were “reasonably 
foreseeable.”139 The projects would take place in the same roadless 
area and all had the potential to affect old-growth habitat in that area. 
Therefore, the agency was required to analyze the combined effects 
from these sales with quantified and detailed information and to 
justify its conclusions about cumulative effects.140 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded by stating, “General statements about ‘possible’ effects and 
‘some risk’ do not constitute a ‘hard look’ absent a justification 
regarding why more definitive information could not be provided.”141 
 
135 Id. at 1379. 
136 Id. at 1379 (citing the USFS’s 1994 Grade/Dukes EIS). 
137 Id. at 1379. 
138 Neighbors I, 137 F.3d at 1379. 
139 Id. at 1380. 
140 Id. at 1379. 
141 Id. at 1380 (internal citations omitted). 
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This statement is cited repeatedly by the court in many of the CEA 
cases that followed Neighbors I.142 As for the agency’s intention to 
monitor in order to facilitate a more complete CEA in the future, the 
court ruled that the agency could not defer a CEA to a later date as 
NEPA requires such analysis before a project takes place; even if 
monitoring information is limited, a CEA must be completed in the 
NEPA analysis.143 
As in Neighbors I, a number of cases have involved complaints 
that a CEA is too general, lacks analysis of effects, or lacks a 
transparent rationale for its conclusions. For example, in Muckleshoot 
Indian Tribe v. United States Forest Service (hereinafter 
Muckleshoot), a case involving the EIS for the Huckleberry Land 
Exchange, the Ninth Circuit also found the CEA to be far too 
general.144 It observed that the EIS contained twelve sections on 
cumulative effects but that “these sections merely provide very broad 
and general statements devoid of specific, reasoned conclusions.”145 
Again, the agency’s CEA described activities but failed to analyze 
effects. The CEA for several alternatives described the amount of 
land to be exchanged and made predictions about whether it would be 
subject to commercial harvest. However, the CEA lacked any analysis 
of the potential effects of those activities on resources, except to say 
that the lands the USFS received in the land exchange would be 
expected to develop greater species diversity over time.146 
The court was dissatisfied with the lack of analysis of the possible 
effects of increased harvesting on lands transferred out of federal 
ownership and reiterated that a CEA must include enough detail to 
assist decision-makers and the public in assessing how cumulative 
impacts might differ across alternatives and how those impacts might 
be mitigated.147 The analysis was also deemed “far too general and 
one-sided” in that it considered only possible beneficial effects, which 
 
142 See, e.g., Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1213 
(9th Cir. 1998); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 810 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
143 Neighbors I, 137 F.3d at 1380. 
144 Muckleshoot, 177 F.3d at 802–03. 
145 Id. at 811. 
146 Id. at 810–11. 
147 Id. at 811. 
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were contingent upon future funding and action by the agency, on the 
lands transferred to the USFS.148 
The same issue arose again in a slightly different form in Oregon 
Natural Resources Council Fund v. Goodman, a case in which the 
plaintiffs challenged the EIS for the proposed expansion of the Mt. 
Ashland Ski Area in the Rogue River National Forest.149 In this case 
the agency failed to discuss cumulative impacts on the Pacific fisher, 
a wildlife species, from the project in conjunction with two other 
future projects. The agency argued that it did not have to provide such 
an analysis because the predicted impacts of the ski area expansion 
were modest. But the court made it clear that such conclusory 
statements, based on expert opinion but without any explanation of 
the underlying rationale, will not receive deference from a reviewing 
court.150 
In summary, the Ninth Circuit has established the following: a 
CEA must include detailed information; a clear analysis of effects on 
resources, not just a description of actions; and an explanation of the 
rationale behind the conclusions in a CEA. In cases where the agency 
clearly analyzes effects, the court has upheld its decisions. In some 
cases, plaintiffs expressed discontent with the outcome of a CEA but 
failed to highlight enough deficiencies in the analysis to convince the 
court that the CEA was inadequate. For example, in Cold Mountain v. 
Garber, the plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the agency’s conclusions 
that helicopter hazing associated with a bison herding facility in the 
Gallatin National Forest would not significantly affect bald eagle 
survival.151 However, the court found that the USFS engaged in a 
sufficient CEA based on the information available to them at the time 
and secured an incidental take statement from the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service based upon its CEA with regard to bald eagles.152 
Likewise, in Environmental Protection Information Center v. United 
States Forest Service, plaintiffs argued that a watershed model used to 
analyze cumulative impacts overlooked significant effects.153 
However, the plaintiffs failed to highlight a specific deficiency with 
the model. The court found that the agency analyzed effects on both a 
 
148 Id. 
149 505 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2007). 
150 Id. at 893. 
151 375 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2004). 
152 Or. Natural Res. Council Fund, 505 F.3d at 893. 
153 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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project and watershed level and that the model provided a sufficient 
amount of detail to meet NEPA requirements.154 
One case from the Tenth Circuit also dealt with the issue of 
whether a CEA included sufficient detail. In Utah Environmental 
Congress v. Richmond, the plaintiffs argued that the CEA in an EIS 
failed to meaningfully or realistically analyze effects of the project on 
water quality and fish populations.155 However, the agency pointed to 
several models it had used to analyze cumulative effects and 
emphasized that NEPA does not prohibit the approval of projects with 
negative effects, as long as the effects are disclosed. The court agreed, 
stating that the plaintiffs seemed to disagree with the agency’s 
decision rather than there being any real deficiency in the CEA.156 
B. Issue 2: Analysis of Past, Present and Reasonably Foreseeable 
Future Effects 
Another common CEA challenge, and one that also was an issue in 
Neighbors I, is whether the agency adequately included and analyzed 
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future projects in its 
analysis. This was the most common complaint in recent CEA cases 
and the most frequent reason the USFS’ CEAs were ruled inadequate. 
Between the years 1998 and 2009, twelve of the twenty-two cases 
reviewed involved this issue, and the agency lost eight of those twelve 
cases for failure to comply with this aspect of the CEA requirement. 
Recall, for example, that in Neighbors I, the agency provided some 
general information about predicted cumulative effects of all 
proposed timber sales in the roadless area, but no specific information 
about individual sales or combined effects on old-growth habitat and 
old-growth species. In this instance, the court ruled that the agency 
must provide specific information about effects from individual 
proposed sales in its CEA.157 
A primary reason the agency lost in Blue Mountains Biodiversity 
Project v. Blackwood was also due to the failure to analyze other 
proposed sales as part of the CEA in an EA prepared for the Big 
 
154 Id. at 1014. 
155 483 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2007). 
156 Id. at 1140. 
157 Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. U.S. Forest Serv., 137 F.3d 1372, 1379 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
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Tower salvage timber sale.158 In this case, the agency had proposed 
five timber sales at the same time and as part of a coordinated fire 
recovery strategy in a single watershed. However, nowhere in the Big 
Tower EA did the agency analyze the cumulative effects from these 
coordinated actions. The court ruled that not only was a CEA required 
for all the projects, but that the cumulative actions requirement (as 
discussed in Kleppe) was triggered.159 Therefore, the agency was 
required to prepare a single EIS to examine the effects of all five 
projects that had been formally proposed as part of a single recovery 
strategy. 
The court declined to require the same, however, in Earth Island 
Institute v. United States Forest Service, in which the plaintiffs 
charged that the agency should have prepared a single EIS for two 
salvage projects on neighboring National Forests, both of which had 
been planned in response to a single fire.160 In this case, the facts that 
the projects would take place in two separate forests, proceed on 
separate time schedules, and be supervised by different personnel led 
the court to accept the agency’s decision to analyze the projects in 
separate NEPA documents.161 Nonetheless, the court ruled the CEA 
inadequate because it failed to analyze the cumulative impacts of the 
project on a spotted owl activity area in the neighboring forest.162 
In Muckleshoot, the court made it clear that the USFS had to 
analyze the combined effects of the proposed land exchange with the 
effects of timber harvest on lands exchanged in previous years and the 
potential effects of another proposed future land exchange in the same 
area.163 The agency argued that the future land exchange was too 
speculative, but the court noted that the exchange had already been 
announced in a press release and that a proposal for the exchange had 
been drafted a full year prior to the issuance of the EIS for the 
Huckleberry exchange.164 However, in Environmental Protection 
Information Center v. United States Forest Service the court accepted 
the agency’s position that it need not include in its CEA an analysis of 
 
158 161 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998). 
159 Id. at 1215. 
160 351 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 2003). 
161 Id. a 1306. 
162 Id. at 1308. 
163 Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 810–12 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
164 Id. at 812. 
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a reasonably foreseeable future project.165 In that case, the details of 
the future project, known as the Meteor sale, were deemed too 
speculative at the time the EA was prepared to allow for a useful 
CEA; furthermore, the agency briefly addressed the cumulative 
impacts expected from the Meteor sale in its response to public 
comments on this issue.166 
Other cases involved distinct circumstances with regard to the issue 
of other past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future actions in the 
CEA area. For instance, in Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. Forsgren, 
which involved an EIS regarding the granting of an easement to 
Stimson Lumber to access its lands via National Forest land, the court 
dealt with the question of whether the agency should have analyzed 
future sales as part of its CEA.167 Because of predicted effects on 
grizzly bears, the agency and Stimson spent several years developing 
a Conservation Agreement that would guide Stimson’s activities for 
all current and future projects in the area. The court reasoned that a 
CEA need not analyze specific future projects in this case where the 
CEA analyzed instead the effects of the Conservation Agreement as a 
whole; the court did note throughout its opinion, however, that the 
decision hinged upon the expected enforcement of the agreement.168 
The issue of analyzing past projects and the extent of the detail 
required in such analyses has become a matter of significant debate 
over the last several years. This issue was central to Lands Council v. 
Powell (hereinafter Lands Council), which involved a challenge to the 
Final EIS (FEIS) for the Iron Honey project in the Idaho Panhandle 
National Forest (IPNF).169 The issue of cumulative impacts from past 
projects was particularly important in this case. The project was a 
watershed restoration project that included logging in an area where 
nearly 40,000 acres had been harvested since the 1960s. In the project 
area, all but two of fourteen watersheds were considered by the USFS 
to be either not functioning or functioning at risk.170 Given this history 
of heavy management in the Iron Honey project area, plaintiffs were 
 
165 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006). 
166 Id. at 1014. 
167 336 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2003). 
168 Id. at 962. 
169 379 F.3d 738, superseded by 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005). 
170 Id. at 1025. 
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particularly interested in the cumulative impacts of past management 
actions and also wanted to know how the proposed actions would 
serve to improve conditions, whereas previous timber sales had 
degraded resource conditions.171 
In its assessment of this matter, the court wrote: “The [FEIS] 
generally describes the past timber harvests . . . and asserts that timber 
harvests have contributed to the environmental problems in the 
Project area. But there is no catalog of past projects and no discussion 
of how those projects (and differences between the projects) have 
harmed the environment.”172 The court made it clear in its decision 
that it already had been established as a general rule under NEPA that 
a CEA must include, at a minimum, a catalog or list of other past, 
present, and future projects and information on the environmental 
effects of these projects; therefore, the vague discussion in the Iron 
Honey FEIS of prior harvests and their general effects was deemed 
unsatisfactory, particularly given the facts of the case.173 
In Lands Council the court held that such a cataloging of projects 
and project effects was necessary for a CEA and also emphasized the 
role of such cataloging in informing an alternatives analysis. In fact, 
the latter point seemed to be the court’s primary problem with the 
agency’s failure to describe in detail past projects and project effects. 
The court explained that a detailed accounting of past projects and 
their effects would help both the agency and the public analyze the 
potential effects of the proposed project.174 The court also noted that 
the information requested would not be difficult or particularly 
cumbersome for the agency to generate.175 
The issue was raised again in Natural Resources Defense Council 
v. United States Forest Service (hereinafter NRDC), in which the 
Natural Resources Defense Council challenged the adequacy of the 
EIS for the 1997 Tongass National Forest Plan.176 The court ruled the 
EIS inadequate for a number of reasons, one of which was the failure 
to analyze the cumulative effects resulting from logging on 
 
171 Id. at 1027. 
172 Id. A catalog of past actions is generally understood to be similar to a list. 
Sometimes past action catalogs include the names and dates of various activities. Catalogs 
of timber sales often include the name and date of the sale along with some information on 
the number of acres treated and the method used. 
173 Id. at 1028. 
174 Id. at 1027–28. 
175 Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1028, n.6. 
176 See generally 421 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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nonfederal timberlands.177 In its decision, the court reiterated its 
holding from Lands Council, emphasizing that a CEA requires, at 
minimum, a cataloging of relevant past, present, and reasonably 
foreseeable future actions along with a discussion of the 
environmental effects of those actions.178 The court again cited this 
aspect of Lands Council as a binding requirement in Oregon Natural 
Resources Council Fund v. Goodman.179 
Analysis of past actions appeared somewhat complicated after 
these decisions. Was the agency required to list all past actions and 
the effects of individual past actions? The answer was not entirely 
clear, nor was it entirely apparent whether the Ninth Circuit was 
mandating a particular methodological approach. In 2005, in response 
to the decision in Lands Council, CEQ issued a memorandum entitled 
“Guidance on the Consideration of Past Actions in Cumulative 
Effects Analysis.”180 In this document, which still guides CEA 
practice, CEQ explained that the NEPA regulations do not 
specifically require agencies to catalog all relevant past actions. The 
CEQ memo emphasized that agencies have significant discretion to 
decide whether such a cataloging is necessary and asserted that, 
“[g]enerally, agencies can conduct an adequate cumulative effects 
analysis by focusing on the current aggregate effects of past actions 
without delving into the historical details of individual past 
actions.”181 NEPA decision makers were reminded to limit the 
information in a NEPA document to what is useful and relevant to 
decision makers and the public. 
There may be cause for concern with CEQ’s approach. One legal 
observer explained, 
When relevant prior actions are lumped into the environmental 
baseline and considered in the aggregate, the lessons of such actions 
are effectively removed from the decision making process. Such 
aggregation may also lead to a false sense of security, in which 
 
177 Id. at 816. 
178 See id. at 815. 
179 505 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2007). 
180 Memorandum from James Connaughton Chariman of the Council on Envtl. Quality 
to Heads of Federal Agencies (June 24, 2005), available at ceq.hsss.doc.gov/NEPA 
/regs/guidance_on_CE.pdf. 
181 Id. at 2. 
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prior degradation is taken for granted because it is considered part 
of the environmental baseline.182 
If this baseline is not compared to anything in the past, it can be 
difficult to determine cumulative impacts. However, the Ninth Circuit 
subsequently explained how this guidance can be understood within 
the context of holdings by the court and determined that CEQ’s memo 
should be afforded deference.183 In League of Wilderness Defenders v. 
United States Forest Service, the court explained that Lands Council 
merely reaffirms the general rule that ‘NEPA requires adequate 
cataloguing of relevant past projects in the area.’ An aggregated 
[CEA] that includes the relevant past-timber-sale inputs comports 
with this standard, and also furthers NEPA’s purpose of 
‘concentrat[ing] on the issues that are truly significant to the action 
in question.’184 
In this same case, however, the court found that the agency had failed 
to provide adequate information on the effects from past actions, 
which it described only very generally, to meet its obligation to take a 
hard look at cumulative impacts.185 
C. Issue 3: Challenges to the Science Used in CEA 
Several cases analyzed for this research involved challenges to the 
quality of the science used in support of a CEA. For example, another 
key issue in the Lands Council decision dealt with the complaint that 
the data used to analyze cumulative effects on the availability of 
westslope cutthroat trout habitat were outdated; the court agreed with 
the plaintiffs, noting that the agency had not collected trout habitat 
data for thirteen years.186 Current information on trout habitat was 
necessary, in the court’s opinion, for understanding the cumulative 
effects of the proposed and past timber harvests on both trout habitat 
 
182 John C. Grothaus, Questionable Authority: A Recent CEQ Guidance Memorandum, 
37 ENVTL. L. 885, 888 (2007). 
183 See League of Wilderness Defenders v. U.S. Forest Serv., 549 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)) (granting deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and noting that such interpretation was 
controlling unless it was plainly inconsistent with the regulation in question). 
184 Id. at 1218 (internal citations omitted). The court further noted that based on its 
decision in Lands Council v. McNair, 549 F.3d at 128–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) that it 
is not their position to impose on agencies particular methodologies for meeting legal 
obligations. 
185 Id. 
186 Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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and populations. Rather than include up-to-date data in its EIS, the 
court stated, the agency used “stale” habitat data to predict effects on 
the species; this was deemed unacceptable as a basis for the 
conclusions in the agency’s CEA.187 The court noted that it does not 
require all data to be immediate, but that in this case the data were 
“too outdated to carry the weight assigned to [them].”188 
The scientific quality of models has also been raised in court with 
regard to CEAs. This issue came up in Lands Council, in which the 
court found several problems with the scientific methodologies used 
by the USFS to estimate effects. For instance, the Lands Council 
argued that a Water and Sediment Yields model had a number of 
shortcomings, a point that the agency conceded to the court. Because 
these shortcomings were not discussed in the EIS, the court ruled that, 
given its heavy reliance on the model in the EIS and failure to 
disclose all of the relevant problems with the model, the agency had 
not satisfied NEPA.189 
Issues about the quality of the science underlying CEA models 
have come up in other cases. In Environmental Protection 
Information Center v. United States Forest Service, plaintiffs 
challenged the use of a cumulative watershed effects model but, 
according to the court, failed to point out any obvious faults with the 
model.190 The court ruled that it had no reason to question the USFS’ 
methodology in this case and that the model was sufficiently detailed 
and quantified to satisfy NEPA requirements.191 
In Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Goodman, the plaintiffs 
challenged the use of a Water Erosion Prediction model and claimed 
it had several shortcomings.192 The court ruled that NEPA does not 
require that the best scientific methodology be used, only that the 
agency adequately disclose the shortcomings and assumptions in 
predictive models.193 The agency did so in its EIS, and the court ruled 
in its favor. The plaintiffs also challenged the use of an Equivalent 
 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 1032. 
190 See generally 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006). 
191 Id. at 1014. 
192 505 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2007). 
193 Id. at 897. 
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Roadless Area model to measure cumulative impacts, but again the 
court found no reason to question the agency’s methodology.194 
According to the court, the USFS had adequately disclosed the nature 
of the model, which included enough detailed and quantified 
information to satisfy NEPA requirements. In summary, agency 
models can be imperfect and have a number of shortcomings, but in 
order to satisfy NEPA, the agency must disclose those limitations in 
its EISs. 
D. Issue 4: Problems with the Scale Chosen for a CEA 
An important aspect of a CEA is the scale chosen for the analysis. 
Courts have required that both the temporal and geographic scales of 
the analysis be explicitly stated and justified as part of a CEA. 
Generally, as long as the agency provides a reasonable explanation 
for its choice and does not contradict statements or choices about 
scale that have been made in other federal environmental analyses, 
courts have upheld agency decisions. 
In Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck (hereinafter NEC), 
plaintiffs complained that the agency failed to analyze the cumulative 
effects of several amendments to road density standards for a number 
of timber sales planned in the Gallatin National Forest.195 The court 
first asked whether the agency should have prepared a programmatic 
EIS for the road density standard amendments that accompanied the 
timber sales because these actions might be considered either 
connected or cumulative actions.196 It found that the compendium of 
amendments could not be considered connected actions because they 
had independent utility.197 Whether the timber sales might be 
considered cumulative actions was a closer call, but the court 
emphasized that the challenge was brought with regard to whether the 
plan amendments, not the timber sales, were cumulative actions.198 It 
found that the amendments had not been developed as part of a 
comprehensive plan and could not be considered cumulative 
actions.199 
 
194 Id. 
195 304 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter NEC]. 
196 Id. at 982. 
197 Id. at 894. 
198 Id. at 895. 
199 Id. 
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Next, the court turned to the question of whether the road density 
standard amendments required a CEA in the particular EA at issue in 
this case.200 On this point, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs; the 
court stated, “[t]he importance of ensuring that EAs consider the 
additive effect of many incremental environmental encroachments is 
clear.”201 In the decision, the court noted that federal agencies prepare 
45,000 EAs a year as compared to about 450 EISs.202 Thus, it 
explained, EAs must consider cumulative impacts; otherwise, the 
cumulative effects of many smaller actions might be missed.203 
Especially in the case of timber sales, the court explained, the 
cumulative impacts of individually minor effects would be easy to 
underestimate and must be considered in the CEA in an EA.204 
With regard to the road density amendments for multiple timber 
sales planned in the Gallatin National Forest, the court held that these 
must be analyzed together as part of a CEA.205 The agency argued 
that this was not necessary because the various timber sales and road 
density standard amendments were widely dispersed throughout the 
forest.206 However, the court disagreed with the agency about the 
appropriate scale of analysis.207 It explained: 
The national forest was the geographic unit within which the Forest 
Service chose to set forth binding road density standards in the 
Forest Plan. . . . Unless the cumulative impacts of these 
amendments are subject to analysis even though distantly spaced 
throughout the Forest, the Forest Service will be free to amend road 
density standards throughout the forest piecemeal, without ever 
having to evaluate the amendments’ cumulative environmental 
impacts.208 
In this case, because the USFS had a forest-wide road density 
standard, it was required by the court to conduct a CEA for road 
 
200 Id. at 895–96. 
201 NEC, 304 F.3d at 896. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 897. 
206 Id. 
207 NEC, 304 F.3d at 892. 
208 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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density standard amendments on a forest-wide scale.209 In other 
words, the agency could not choose a scale for its CEA analysis in 
this EA that conflicted with the choice of scale for a resource in its 
forest plan. 
NEC also involved a challenge brought under the Endangered 
Species Act, and the court’s decision on that point also dealt with a 
CEA issue.210 Although this was not a CEA challenge under NEPA, 
the holding is relevant for understanding how the Ninth Circuit views 
the issue of the appropriate scale of analysis for cumulative 
environmental impacts. In the USFS’s biological assessment of the 
project’s impacts on grizzly bears, the agency chose a cumulative 
effects area that failed to analyze the effects on grizzly bears in light 
of a nearby sheep grazing allotment less than two miles away from 
the project area.211 The agency provided no explanation for its choice 
of scale for the CEA in the biological assessment and no justification 
for why the grazing allotment had been left out of the analysis area.212 
The court ruled the choice arbitrary, particularly given that another 
EIS had acknowledged the significant impact of the grazing allotment 
on grizzly bears and that the timber sale at issue in this case would 
clearly affect grizzly habitat.213 
Two lessons should be taken from this. First, the agency has to 
provide reasonable justification for its choice of the size of a 
cumulative effects analysis area. Second, if the choice appears 
arbitrary in light of other NEPA analyses or agency documents, a 
court is far less likely to defer to an agency’s decision without 
adequate justification. 
The issue of the scale of a CEA for wildlife was raised again in 
Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc. v. Rittenhouse (hereinafter 
Rittenhouse), a challenge to several timber sales in the Boise National 
Forest.214 In this case, the agency again got into trouble for making 
choices and conclusions in an EIS that conflicted with statements in 
another USFS report. The 1996 Monitoring Report for the Boise 
National Forest stated, with regard to several species that use old-
growth habitat, “Forest Plan direction is inadequate to provide for 
 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 900–03. 
211 Id. at 901–02. 
212 NEC, 304 F.3d at 902. 
213 Id. 
214 305 F.3d 957, 960(9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Rittenhouse]. 
SCHULTZ 7/10/2012 9:23 AM 
2012] History of the Cumulative Effects Analysis 163 
Requirement Under NEPA and Its Interpretation in 
U.S. Forest Service Case Law 
habitat needs, because the habitat needs of these species must be 
addressed at a landscape scale.”215 However, the EIS at issue in this 
case analyzed cumulative impacts to several species using their home 
range as the scale of analysis.216 The court held that the agency must 
prepare a new or supplemental EIS that was consistent with the 
conclusions of its own scientists in the monitoring report.217 Absent a 
clear rationale for choosing a smaller scale of analysis that 
contradicted conclusions from its own documents, the choice of the 
scale for the CEA was deemed arbitrary and capricious.218 
In several other cases, however, the agency’s choices with regard 
to the scale of a CEA were upheld. For instance, in Neighbors of 
Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, a case that revisited the EIS for the 
same sale challenged in Neighbors I, the agency’s choice of scale for 
the CEA was deemed appropriate.219 In this case the agency 
conducted an extensive CEA but chose to analyze the effects of the 
sale only for the west side of the Payette National Forest.220 The 
plaintiffs argued that the CEA area should have included the east side 
of the forest, but the court found that the agency made a reasoned 
decision and explicitly justified its choice in the EIS.221 The court 
therefore deferred to the agency’s choice of the appropriate scale of 
analysis. 
Both the geographic and temporal scope of the CEA in the Stimson 
Project EIS were challenged in Selkirk Conservation Alliance v. 
Forsgren (hereinafter Selkirk).222 Recall that this case involved an EIS 
analyzing the effects of granting the Stimson Lumber Company an 
easement to access private inholdings in the Colville National 
Forest.223 Plaintiffs claimed that the CEA should have included a 
proposed Stimson project on the neighboring Idaho Panhandle 
National Forest.224 However, the agency explicitly considered 
 
215 Id. at 973 (citing the 1996 Monitoring Report). 
216 See id. at 973–74. 
217 Id. at 974. 
218 Id. 
219 303 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. 
222 336 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Selkirk]. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 951, 958. 
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including this project in its CEA and decided not to based on an 
analysis of the relevant watersheds, wildlife activity areas, viewsheds, 
and transportation systems.225 Furthermore, an agency biologist 
expressed concern that including the nearby project could make 
environmental effects appear less significant.226 In light of the 
reasoned justification for its choice, the court upheld the agency’s 
determination of the appropriate geographic scale of the CEA.227 
In Selkirk, the plaintiffs also challenged the fact that the agency 
only analyzed cumulative effects for a three-year period into the 
future.228 The USFS chose this short time frame despite the fact that 
the Conservation Agreement established with Stimson ran for five 
years.229 Furthermore, a USFS wildlife biologist had originally chosen 
a ten-year time frame for the cumulative effects analysis.230 The 
Stimson Lumber Company advanced the only argument before the 
court in defense of this choice; it explained that the USFS chose this 
short time period because of the uncertainty of the regulatory 
environment surrounding the Conservation Agreement.231 Three years 
was the longest time frame in which the agency could be sure which 
rules from both the state and the USFS would govern Stimson’s 
activities.232 However, the court noted that the agency certainly could 
have made a decent guess at what Stimson’s activities would be in 
years four and five, despite some uncertainties as to future 
regulations.233 Nonetheless, although the court agreed that a longer 
time frame would have been preferable, it did not find the choice of 
the three-year time period arbitrary.234 It reasoned that the agency had 
some information available for a longer time period but had the most 
information available for the three-year period.235 Again, provisions in 
the Conservation Agreement stating that it would be revised in light 
 
225 Id. at 958–59. 
226 Id. at 959. 
227 Id. at 960. 
228 Selkirk, 336 F.3d at 961. 
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of new information were critical to the court’s decision to uphold the 
less-than-ideal time frame for the CEA.236 
E. Issue 5: Postponing a CEA or Tiering to Another Environmental 
Analysis 
Another recurrent issue in a number of the CEA cases reviewed 
involved situations where the agency postponed a CEA or tiered a 
CEA to another document. This issue is closely related to the shell-
game, discussed earlier in the context of Tenakee Springs.237 In that 
case, the USFS first tried to argue that it had analyzed cumulative 
impacts in its forest plan and then, when the court found the forest 
plan analysis insufficient, argued that it would analyze cumulative 
impacts in its upcoming forest plan revision. The notion of the shell-
game refers to just this type of scenario wherein one is directed to 
various stages of planning in search of an environmental analysis that, 
in the end, does not appear to have happened at all. 
This issue also arose in Muckleshoot, in which the agency argued 
that it had analyzed cumulative impacts in the forest plan, to which 
the Huckleberry EIS had been tiered.238 The court noted first that an 
agency cannot tier to a non-NEPA document such as a forest plan (the 
Huckleberry EIS tiered to the forest plan, not the EIS for the forest 
plan).239 Secondly, the court found that nothing in the forest plan 
examined the specific effects of this land exchange, which was still 
too speculative at that time to be adequately evaluated, nor did it 
analyze the effects of logging on lands exchanged in previous 
years.240 The court concluded, “[i]f we were to adopt the Forest 
Service’s approach, the cumulative impacts of lands exchanges would 
escape environmental review.”241 
The issue of postponing a CEA was central in High Sierra Hikers 
Association v. Blackwell, in which the plaintiffs argued that the USFS 
must complete an EIS to analyze the cumulative effects of issuing 
 
236 Id. at 963. 
237 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text. 
238 See Muckleshoot, supra note 163. 
239 Id. at 810. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 810–11. 
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multiyear permits to private outfitters in two wilderness areas.242 In 
this case the district court ruled against the agency, finding that the 
issuance of such permits was likely to contribute to significant 
cumulative effects, triggering the requirement for an EIS.243 The 
agency agreed that such an EIS was required but explained that it 
would prepare the EIS once it decided how to move forward with its 
wilderness management plans. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district 
court’s decision to provide plaintiffs with injunctive relief, stating that 
NEPA requires an analysis of effects prior to agency activities and 
that such analysis could not be postponed.244 
The court also dealt with the issue of postponing CEA in NRDC, 
which dealt with the failure of the agency to analyze cumulative 
effects of timber harvest on private lands in its 1997 Tongass forest 
plan.245 The Forest Service argued that the plan was only a guidance 
document and that specific cumulative impacts would be analyzed at 
the project level when the details of specific activities were more 
concrete.246 Here the court referred to its decision in 1993 in 
Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, in which it established that a forest plan 
EIS requires a CEA.247 However, in Resources Ltd. v. Robertson the 
court allowed the agency to defer consideration of effects resulting 
from actions on nonfederal lands until project-level analyses. In 
NRDC, the court decided otherwise, holding that the forest plan must 
include a CEA cataloging and analyzing the impacts of high-volume 
timber harvest on private lands.248 
There are several factors that likely led the court to judge that in 
this case such a CEA must be done at the plan level. Over five percent 
of the forest in southeast Alaska is owned by nonfederal entities, and 
those lands had been heavily logged.249 The forest plan called for high 
levels of logging on adjacent and nearby lands with serious 
implications for old-growth habitat and species. The court reasoned: 
 
242 High Sierra Hiker Ass’n v. Blackwell, 381 F.3d 886, superseded by 390 F.3d 630 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
243 High Sierra Hike Ass’n v. Powell, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (N.D. Ca. 2001). 
244 High Sierra Hikers Ass’n, 390 F.3d at 644–45. 
245 Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 2005). 
246 Id. at 799–800. 
247 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text. 
248 Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 F.3d at 816. 
249 Id. at 815. 
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At least in the particular circumstances of this case, the cumulative 
impacts on wildlife viability from continued “highgrading” by non-
federal entities, as well as by the Forest Service . . . ought to be 
considered in a single, programmatic EIS. . . . A cumulative effects 
analysis in a programmatic EIS is necessary here for the Forest 
Service and public to make a rational evaluation of this proposed 
federal action balancing the competing goals of timber harvest, 
environmental preservation, and recreational use in the Tongass.250 
In other words, given the potential role of the CEA at the plan level to 
inform multiple-use decisions in the plan, the court opined that in this 
case a CEA for nonfederal actions should occur at the programmatic 
level. 
Although the court provided a rationale for its decision in the case 
of the Tongass forest plan revision, the direction from the courts on 
this issue is somewhat muddled. There is no clear answer as to 
whether the court will require a CEA that looks at activities on private 
lands in a forest plan EIS. The decision as to what resources require 
an in-depth CEA at a plan/programmatic level will depend on the 
circumstances of the case and likely on the panel that hears the case. 
F. Issue 6: Cumulative Effects of Categorically Excluded Projects 
A final and critical issue that arises in case law from both the Ninth 
and Tenth Circuits is the issue of cumulative impacts as a result of 
projects done under a categorical exclusion (CatEx).251 Categorical 
exclusion categories define types of projects that can essentially be 
expedited through the NEPA process. These categories are supposed 
to identify types of projects that will not have significant effects, 
including significant cumulative effects, on the environment; for such 
projects no EA or EIS is required. Instead, managers are required to 
 
250 Id. at 816. 
251 The categorical exclusion provision is found at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010) and reads: 
“Categorical exclusion” means a category of actions which do not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have 
been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency in 
implementation of these regulations (§ 1507.3) and for which, therefore, neither an 
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required. An 
agency may decide in its procedures or otherwise, to prepare environmental 
assessments for the reasons stated in § 1508.9 even though it is not required to do 
so. Any procedures under this section shall provide for extraordinary circumstances 
in which a normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect. 
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do some scoping and issue a decision memo detailing the nature of 
the project and why it fits into a particular CatEx category.252 
Prior to 2003, the USFS had one CatEx category for vegetation 
management projects; as part of the Bush administration’s Healthy 
Forests Initiative (HFI) of 2002, the USFS expanded its use of 
CatExes and in 2003 created four new CatEx categories for vegetation 
management projects.253 The Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) explains, “[l]ittle is known about the Forest Service’s use of 
these categorical exclusions because, prior to 2005, the agency did not 
maintain nationwide data on their use.”254 However, the GAO’s study 
of the use of vegetation management CatExes between 2003 and 2005 
found that nearly seventy-five percent of such projects are now 
completed under a CatEx, accounting for almost half of the acreage 
treated by the USFS.255 
In terms of CEAs, plaintiffs have brought both facial and applied 
challenges to CatEx categories and projects. A recent case from the 
Ninth Circuit dealing with this issue is Sierra Club v. Bosworth.256 At 
issue in this case was the Fuels CatEx category, or CatEx category 10, 
created in 2003, which allowed for categorical exclusion of all fuels 
reduction projects up to 1000 acres and prescribed burn projects up to 
4500 acres across the entire National Forest system.257 The plaintiffs 
argued that the agency should have prepared an EIS before 
promulgating the category, establishing that the category would not 
have significant cumulative impacts as a result of the implementation 
of numerous categorically excluded projects under the Fuels CatEx. 
Some additional background is necessary to understand this case. 
CEQ regulations regarding CatExes state that agencies may “identify 
categories of actions which do not individually or cumulatively have a 
significant effect on the human environment.”258 Additionally, agency 
procedures are supposed to provide information on “extraordinary 
 
252 There are also USFS CatEx categories for activities that do not require a decision 
memo. These include activities such as routine building maintenance or the issuance of 
administrative procedures. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, USE OF 
CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONS FOR VEGETATION MANAGEMENT PROJECTS, CALENDAR 
YEARS 2003 THROUGH 2005 (2006), at n.8. 
253 Id. at 1. 
254 Id. at 1–2. 
255 Id. at 3. 
256 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). 
257 Id. at 1019. 
258 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010). 
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circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a 
significant environmental effect,” in which case an EA or EIS would 
be required.259 Importantly, as the court noted in Sierra Club v. 
Bosworth, just before the creation of this category, the USFS changed 
its direction on “extraordinary circumstances.”260 Beginning in 2007, 
various resource conditions, such as the presence of highly erosive 
soils, roadless areas, or areas with threatened or endangered species, 
that before had automatically triggered the extraordinary 
circumstances condition and required the completion of an EA or EIS, 
now only required consideration of whether the provision is triggered 
and an EA or EIS is required.261 In other words, managers can now 
use their judgment in deciding whether the potential effects on these 
resource conditions require more analysis than would be done for a 
CatEx. This increased discretion gives cause for concern that CatEx 
projects might have significant effects that are overlooked. In this 
case, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, for example, raised concerns 
about the flexibility in the definition of extraordinary circumstances 
and the fact that such flexibility might lead to adverse impacts on 
streams and fish habitat.262 
In its decision regarding the Fuels CatEx, the court stated that an 
EIS is not required as part of the process of creating a CatEx category, 
but that a CatEx category can only be created if the agency 
determines that the category includes projects that will not have 
significant cumulative effects.263 Therefore, even though an EIS is not 
required, a CEA is still required as part of the process of creating a 
CatEx category, and the court found numerous reasons why the 
agency’s CEA, or lack thereof, was inadequate. The agency conceded 
that it never conducted a CEA for the category as a whole but argued 
that CEAs would be conducted at the project level. The court found 
 
259 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010). The extraordinary circumstances issue is addressed in 
the USFS handbook in Ch. 30. The handbook lists resources conditions, such as the 
presence of endangered species, wilderness and roadless areas, wetlands, and other factors 
that “should be considered in determining whether extraordinary circumstances related to a 
proposed action warrant further analysis and documentation in an EA or an EIS…” 
(section 30.4). 
260 510 F.3d at 1020–22. 
261 Id. at 1020–21. 
262 Id. at 1033. 
263 Id. at 1026. 
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this argument to be in direct contradiction to the intent of a CatEx 
category, which should be made for a group of projects that together 
would not have significant cumulative impacts.264 In essence, a CatEx 
category should relieve decision makers of the need to determine in 
every case whether cumulative effects are likely, except in cases of 
extraordinary circumstances. A CEA for the category was particularly 
important in this case, according to the court, given the nationwide 
scope of the category and its potential to affect over a million acres 
per year.265 As the court explained, “if assessing the cumulative 
impacts of the Fuels CatEx as a whole is impractical, then use of the 
categorical exclusion mechanism was improper.”266 
Further problems with the agency’s analysis regarding the potential 
effects of the Fuels CatEx hark back to criticisms from the court from 
other CEA cases. For example, the USFS conducted a data call as part 
of the process of creating the Fuels CatEx to consider approximately 
2500 previous fuels reduction projects and their effects. The report 
summarizing the results of the data call included many sections 
entitled cumulative effects, but the court found that these sections 
lacked detail or provided little support for summary conclusions of no 
significant cumulative impacts.267 The court wrote, “[t]he Forest 
Service does not reveal its methodology or offer any quantified results 
supporting its conclusory statements that there are no cumulative 
impacts—it argues only that through the exercise of its expertise it 
determined that there was no such impact. This is insufficient.”268 
Moreover, the agency made the same mistake it did in Muckleshoot of 
emphasizing solely the potential beneficial effects of projects without 
conducting a broader analysis of overall environmental effects.269 
Projects in the data call also sometimes included mitigation 
measures to minimize effects, but, as the court noted, CatEx projects 
 
264 Id. at 1027. 
265 Id. at 1028. 
266 Bosworth, 510 F.3d at 1028. 
267 Id. at 1029. Numerous projects in the data call were found to have had potentially 
significant effects on wildlife, soils, and water quality but the report concluded these 
effects were either localized, temporary, or of minor significance. Some of the projects 
analyzed as part of the data call did have significant cumulative impacts, but the report on 
the data call does not give any information as to what types of projects might lead to 
significant effects. 
268 Id. at 1028. 
269 Id. at 1029 (citing Muckleshoot, 177 F.3d 800). 
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do not require mitigation measures.270 Therefore, the category was 
deemed to lack the specificity needed to justify its use. The CatEx 
“fail[ed] to identify the maximum diameter of species of trees that are 
permitted to be logged”, specified “no limit on the proximity of 
different projects under the Fuels [CatEx], nor any cap on the number 
of projects in a particular watershed, ecosystem, or endangered 
species habitat area,” and lacked restrictions on thinning and road 
densities.271 For these reasons, the court issued a nationwide 
injunction on the Fuels CatEx for the lack of CEA or any other 
detailed analysis of potential effects. 
Two cases in the Tenth Circuit also centered around the CatEx 
issue. The first case, Colorado Wild v. United States Forest Service, 
involved a facial and applied challenge to CatEx category 13, which 
is for small-scale timber projects and replaces a former CatEx 
category that was similar in scope.272 As part of developing the new 
CatEx category 13, the USFS undertook several levels of analysis.273 
For one, it considered all of the projects that had been conducted 
under the former CatEx category in 1998, prior to the creation of the 
new category.274 It also selected 154 previous timber projects that 
either: (1) had been approved under the former CatEx category, (2) 
had been approved after an EA or EIS was completed but which could 
have fit within the definitions of the former CatEx, or (3) were small 
in scope.275 Importantly, none of the projects selected had predicted 
significant effects.276 USFS teams also conducted post-
implementation monitoring to verify that no significant effects had 
occurred for those projects.277 Based on this review, the USFS created 
three new CatEx categories.278 Category 12 allows for live timber 
harvests less than seventy acres in size, category 13 allows for salvage 
harvests less than 250 acres in size, and category 14 allows for 
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harvest of insect-infested or diseased trees on sites less than 250 acres 
in size.279 
In Colorado Wild v. United States Forest Service, the plaintiffs 
challenged the creation of category 13 for its failure to adequately 
consider cumulative impacts.280 Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged 
the methodology used to create the category.281 The size limit of 250 
acres was chosen because it was just below the average for all salvage 
projects reviewed by the USFS during its process of creating the new 
CatEx categories.282 The plaintiffs explained that the median size of 
such projects was fifty acres, but that the average size was skewed 
because of the presence of several very large projects, including one 
of 9000 acres, in the pre-selected sample.283 Essentially, the 
environmental groups took issue with the fact that the USFS found a 
few large projects that had no predicted significant impacts and 
included these in a selected sample of projects.284 Indeed, the USFS 
process was biased. Either it should have removed the statistical 
outliers from its sample or undertaken the analysis based on a random 
sampling method. However, the court did not find that the plaintiffs 
had met their burden of showing that the large projects in the sample 
were unusual or ought to have been excluded from the analysis.285 
Compounding the USFS’ inadequate analysis, according to the 
plaintiffs, was the fact that the CatEx category allowed for a half-mile 
of temporary road construction under the new CatExes.286 To come up 
with this limit, the USFS noted that thirty-five of the projects it 
selected included an average of one-half mile of temporary road, even 
though 119 of the projects it selected had no road construction at 
all.287 In determining the amount of road to be constructed the USFS 
did not take the average road length across all projects. Instead, it first 
removed all projects with no roads from its sample and then took an 
average for the remaining projects.288 This approach was inconsistent 
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with its process for setting an acreage limit, and, consequently, there 
appeared to be limited objectivity in the USFS’ process for 
determining what types of salvage projects ought to be categorically 
excluded.289 Nonetheless, the court in this case deferred to the USFS’ 
methodology.290 Noting its “admittedly lay perspective” on these 
statistical issues, the court refused to substitute its judgment for the 
agency’s.291 In general, the level of review as to the nature of the 
agency’s approach to analyzing CEAs before making a CatEx 
category appeared somewhat more relaxed in this Tenth Circuit case 
than what was undertaken by the Ninth Circuit. 
As for CEAs, the environmental groups in this case contended that, 
particularly given the deficiencies in how this CatEx category was 
created, its use might lead to significant cumulative impacts.292 Recall 
that actions under CatEx categories must not lead to significant 
cumulative impacts.293 The court’s response was that agencies are 
required to conduct scoping even on CatEx projects. In this process, 
the court reasoned, project managers determine whether significant 
effects might result from a project, which would then trigger the need 
for more detailed environmental review.294 This provision, according 
to the court, provides a safety net for cases when a project or multiple 
projects in the same area might have significant cumulative effects.295 
The plaintiffs also expressed concern that the agency might break up 
bigger projects into smaller ones that fit under this CatEx category.296 
Despite the fact that they cite numerous cases in which the agency 
was found to do just this, the court stated that it had no choice but to 
trust that the agency would observe the law in its application of this 
CatEx.297 
Another Tenth Circuit case from 2006, involved an applied 
challenge to a project in the Fishlake National Forest. In Utah 
Environmental Congress v. Bosworth, plaintiffs argued that the Seven 
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Mile Project, approved under CatEx category 14, failed to include an 
adequate CEA.298 The plaintiffs charged that the agency failed to 
conduct a CEA for indicator species or create a large enough 
cumulative effects boundary. The court reasoned that requiring a CEA 
for a project approved under a CatEx category would render the 
whole notion of CatExes useless.299 The court also noted that a CEA 
should already have been conducted when the category was 
promulgated but did not review whether this was the case, as the 
category as a whole was not challenged by the plaintiffs.300 
The court further explained that the only reason a CEA might be 
required in this case would be if extraordinary circumstances were 
present and wrote: 
We agree that it may be conceptually possible for a large number of 
small projects to collectively create conditions that could 
significantly affect the environment. But the regulation itself 
contains a provision to address that concern, namely the 
extraordinary circumstances exception. And the extraordinary 
circumstances safety-valve is more than capable of addressing 
specific harms allegedly created by specific projects. . . .301 
All in all this seems to place a considerable burden on the 
extraordinary circumstances provision, which is somewhat worrisome 
given the flexibility the agency now has significant discretion to 
determine if such circumstances exist and warrant preparation of an 
EA or EIS. The plaintiffs also noted that the decision memo for the 
Seven Mile project acknowledged potential effects to several sensitive 
species and, therefore, the extraordinary circumstances provision 
should have been triggered. However, the court found that such 
effects were not predicted to be significant and therefore did not 
require further analysis.302 Extraordinary circumstances, according to 
the USFS handbook, only exist when there may be a potentially 
significant effect.303 
It would be fair if, at this point, the reader is thoroughly confused. 
Is it not easy to imagine multiple projects with individually less-than-
 
298 443 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2006). 
299 Id. at 740. 
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303 FOREST SERVICE HANDBOOK, ch. 30 § 30.3, available at wwww.fs.fed.us 
/recreation/programs/ohv/chap30.pdf. 3. 
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significant effects to sensitive species that would be cumulatively 
significant? When and how would this situation be detected? And is 
an EA not the proper document for determining whether effects to a 
particular resource are or are not significant? Is this an appropriate 
determination to make for a categorically excluded project, for which 
a CEA is not even conducted? 
Given this maze of requirements regarding the nature of 
cumulative impacts and CatEx categories, one cannot envy the 
positions of the public or agency staff members, who must wade 
through this complicated decision-making framework. Agency 
personnel are left to sort through these court decisions and figure out 
whether they must consider cumulative effects as part of scoping or 
considering extraordinary circumstances, or whether the heavy lifting 
for CEA was adequately handled during the creation of the category. 
If some sort of CEA has to occur for CatEx projects, it is unclear what 
form this analysis should take given that courts have said a CatEx 
project does not require a CEA. The current situation may be the 
inevitable result of the improper creation of CatEx categories that 
include projects that may have cumulatively significant impacts. As 
noted earlier, the number of projects completed by the USFS under a 
CatEx category has been significant in recent years, and the 
definitions of these categories appear to push the boundaries as to the 
types of projects that can be approved without more detailed 
environmental analysis. 
In summary, it is clear that the agency has the responsibility of 
ensuring that projects that fall under CatEx will not have significant 
cumulative impacts, but it is less clear that the agency is meeting its 
obligations in this area. As the court explained in Utah Environmental 
Congress v. Bosworth: 
[R]elatively little analysis is required of the Forest Service once it 
determines that a project fits within the four corners of a categorical 
exclusion. This is because the Forest Service previously did the 
heavy lifting when it created the categorical exclusion—it 
conducted an extensive environmental analysis and determined that 
any project approved under a categorical exclusion would not 
produce a significant or cumulative effect on the environment in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances.304 
 
304 443 F.3d at 750. 
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This is the ideally how CatEx categories are meant to work; the 
problem is that it is unclear whether the agency really has done this 
heavy lifting for some of the current CatEx categories. The Ninth 
Circuit found that, at least for one category, the agency had not met 
its responsibilities in this area. It seems the Tenth Circuit has deemed 
that as long as a CatEx category stands, scoping, the illegality of 
segmenting projects, and the extraordinary circumstances provision 
are adequate for preventing cumulative impacts. 
At present, USFS staff determine whether cumulative impacts will 
occur during scoping and consideration of extraordinary 
circumstances. This type of analysis is what an EA or EIS is for, 
however, and is why CatEx categories are supposed to include only 
activities which have already been determined not to have an 
individually or cumulatively significant impact. The key question is 
whether the Tenth Circuit’s position on this matter and the USFS’ use 
of CatExes for projects that may have significant cumulative impacts 
are unsatisfactory and skirt the requirements of NEPA and CEA. 
Undoubtedly, the current legal and administrative decision-making 
frameworks, as a result of this direction from the courts and 
questionable use of CatExes by the agency, may be serious 
impediments to effectively conducting CEA, especially for CatEx 
projects. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to the more straightforward aspects of CEA, the 
Ninth Circuit has established relatively clear standards for how the 
analysis must be presented in NEPA documents. For example, the 
agency cannot fail to include other relevant projects in its analysis. 
Some sort of catalog of past projects much be provided, and 
reasonably foreseeable future projects must also be included in the 
CEA as long as the details of those projects are known with any 
specificity. Adequate empirical support and an explanation of the 
rationale behind conclusions must be provided in a CEA. The analysis 
cannot be postponed to a forthcoming NEPA document, nor can it tier 
to either a non-NEPA document or a programmatic document that 
does not include analysis specific enough to be relevant for the 
decision at hand. Data cannot be obviously outdated, particularly if 
the data plays a big role in supporting a CEA. The scale of the 
analysis must be explicitly stated, and the choice of both temporal and 
geographic scale of a CEA must be justified with some degree of 
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clear reasoning. In general, claims of professional expertise alone will 
not survive judicial review. 
The case law is less consistent in terms of the aspects of CEA that 
are more complicated and confusing. For instance, some of the most 
challenging aspects of implementing the CEA requirement involve 
the questions of how exactly to capture impacts from many past 
actions and whether CEA is most appropriately tackled at the 
programmatic or project level. Indeed, it is in these areas that judicial 
decisions are not always consistent and vary according to the specific 
facts of the case. For instance, it is not entirely clear to what extent 
the agency must disclose the effects of individual past projects as 
opposed to relying upon a portrait of current conditions as an 
indicator of cumulative impacts. Requirements for CEA in 
programmatic NEPA analyses also vary from case to case. For 
example, it is unclear to what extent a CEA must be included in forest 
plan EISs. There is also no bright line rule as to when a reviewing 
court will deem necessary a programmatic document for reviewing 
cumulative actions. Finally, the issue of providing a CEA for CatEx 
categories and projects is also messy and turns on the issue of how 
and when to provide a look at the cumulative impacts of many smaller 
or less impactful actions. 
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TABLE 1. Ninth Circuit CEA Cases: Primary Challenges and Holdings 
Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
Neighbors of Cuddy 
Mountain v. USFS, 
137 F.3d 1372 (1998) 
 
A challenge to 
Grade/Dukes timber sale 
EIS on the Payette 
National Forest, Idaho. 
Plaintiffs contended the 
CEA was too general and 
lacked detailed analysis 
of effects of this and 
other proposed sales on 
old-growth habitat. 
 
CEA inadequate 
1) The court deemed the 
discussion of cumulative 
impacts too general; it 
failed to meet “the hard 
look” standard. A CEA 
must include detailed 
and quantified 
information. 
2) A CEA with specific 
discussion of other 
reasonably foreseeable 
future sales must be 
included. 
3) A CEA cannot be 
postponed until after a 
decision when more data 
is available; NEPA 
requires analysis before 
the action is taken. 
Idaho Sporting 
Congress v. Thomas, 
137 F.3d 1146 (1998) 
 
A challenge to Miners 
Creek and West Camas 
Creek timber sale EAs 
on the Targhee National 
Forest, Idaho. Plaintiffs 
argued the USFS should 
have supplemented the 
EA for the earlier of the 
two sales to account for 
cumulative impacts from 
the more recently 
proposed sale. They also 
argued the USFS should 
have prepared an EIS for 
both sales to address 
cumulative impacts. 
CEA inadequate 
1) The court ruled that an 
EIS is required for the 
sales in order to address 
controversy and 
uncertainty over possible 
effects on water quality 
and fisheries. 
2) Cumulative impacts 
were addressed in the 
latter of the two EAs. If 
the court were not 
requiring an EIS, there 
would be no need to 
supplement the earlier 
EA so that it includes the 
same information as the 
latter EA. 
3) The court implies that 
the CEA in the latter EA 
is inadequate; they say it 
is “sparse” and 
inadequacies can be 
addressed in forthcoming 
EIS. 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
Blue Mountains 
Biodiversity Project v. 
Blackwood, 161 F.3d 
1208 (1998) 
A challenge to the EA 
for Big Tower salvage 
timber sale on the 
Umatilla National Forest, 
Oregon. The EA failed to 
mention or analyze 
effects from other 
proposed sales in the 
area. 
 
CEA inadequate 
1) The USFS failed to 
mention three of the four 
other sales in the EA. All 
five sales were proposed 
at the same time as part 
of a coordinated fire 
recovery strategy. The 
court ruled these all 
should have been 
analyzed in a single EIS 
(the cumulative actions 
requirement was 
triggered). 
2) The effects analysis 
for this sale is deemed 
inadequate and 
unjustified in its 
conclusions. The 
analysis lacks specificity, 
and the agency’s 
assertions of no 
significant impacts from 
this sale are unsupported 
and inconsistent with 
statements in other 
documents, such as the 
forest plan. In a case 
where the effects 
analysis is insufficient, 
the CEA also must be 
inadequate. 
Muckleshoot Indian 
Tribe v. USFS, 177 
F.3d 800 (1999) 
A challenge to the EIS 
for Huckleberry Land 
Exchange in Mt. Baker-
Snoqualmie National 
Forest, Washington for 
failure to analyze 
cumulative effects of 
logging on lands that 
were part of an earlier 
exchange, other USFS 
lands, and lands to be 
exchanged in the 
foreseeable future. 
CEA inadequate 
1) The agency argued 
that the CEA was done 
in the Forest Plan and 
also points to another 
non-NEPA report. The 
court ruled that the 
agency cannot tier a 
project-level EIS to a 
forest plan or any other 
non-NEPA document. 
Furthermore, neither the 
forest plan nor its 
accompanying EIS 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
provided an analysis of 
the cumulative impacts 
resulting from this land 
exchange. 
2) The agency failed to 
analyze cumulative 
effects of logging on 
lands proposed for 
exchange and only 
discuss speculative 
benefits that would result 
on lands it received. The 
analysis is deemed too 
general and one-sided. 
3) A future land 
exchange should have 
been included in CEA. 
Its inclusion would not 
have been speculative, as 
the land exchange had 
been announced prior to 
the completion of the 
Huckleberry EIS. 
Neighbors of Cuddy 
Mountain v. 
Alexander, 303 F.3d 
1059 (2002) 
Another challenge to the 
EIS for the Grande-
Dukes sale claiming the 
scale of the CEA was too 
small. 
CEA adequate 
1) The court found that 
the agency provided 
substantial analysis and 
adequate justification for 
its choice of geographic 
scale in its CEA. 
2) Plaintiffs used the 
National Forest 
Management Act to 
address a cumulative 
effects issue. Plaintiffs 
argued that the agency 
failed to monitor and 
protect old-growth in 
violation of its forest 
plan’s forest-wide old-
growth standard. The 
court ruled that even if 
the old-growth standard 
was being met in the 
project area, the 
cumulative effects of 
loss of old-growth 
habitat forest-wide were 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
relevant for compliance 
with the plan and with 
NFMA. Therefore, 
project approval in this 
case required 
consideration of forest-
wide effects. 
Native Ecosystems 
Council v. Dombeck, 
304 F.3d 886 (2002) 
A challenge to the 
Darroch-Eagle timber 
sale EA on the Gallatin 
National Forest, 
Montana. Plaintiffs 
contended the USFS 
should have issued a 
comprehensive EIS to 
analyze all road density 
standard amendments in 
concert and that the 
USFS failed in its EA to 
analyze cumulative 
impacts of amendments 
to road density standards 
at a forest-wide scale. 
CEA inadequate 
1) The court held that the 
compendium of road 
density plan amendments 
were not connected or 
cumulative actions, and a 
single EIS was not 
required. 
2) The court also held 
that EAs must include a 
CEA or tier to an EIS, 
and other road density 
standard plan 
amendments must be 
considered in this EA as 
part of CEA. 
3) The National Forest is 
the scale for the road 
density standards in the 
plan and therefore should 
have been the scale used 
for the CEA. 
Idaho Sporting 
Congress Inc., v. 
Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 
957 (2002) 
A challenge to two 
timber sales on the Boise 
National Forest, Idaho, 
arguing that the scale of 
analysis for cumulative 
impacts on old-growth 
dependent species was 
too small. 
CEA inadequate 
The USFS’ own 
monitoring report stated 
that some species require 
viability analysis at the 
landscape level. The 
agency analyzed CEA at 
a smaller scale and did 
not justify why it did so. 
The agency’s own 
documentation made the 
CEA in the EIS arbitrary, 
particularly where the 
choice lacked any 
justification. 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
Selkirk Conservation 
Alliance v. Forsgren, 
336 F.3d 944 (2003) 
A challenge to EIS for 
granting an easement to 
Stimson (a private timber 
corporation) to access its 
lands on the Colville 
National Forest, 
Washington. 
Plaintiffs argued the 
geographic scale of 
analysis was too small 
and that the agency 
failed to analyze effects 
of future projects in area. 
They also argued the 
temporal scale of the 
CEA was too short. 
CEA adequate 
1) The court held that the 
agency provided a 
reasoned justification for 
its choice not to include 
Idaho Panhandle 
National Forest areas in 
the CEA for grizzly 
bears. 
2) The court stated that 
the agency did not need 
to consider the effects of 
specific sales in the EIS 
because this would 
duplicate its assessment 
of the adequacy of the 
Conservation 
Agreement, which was 
the basis of and was 
analyzed in the EIS. 
3) The short time frame 
chosen for the CEA was 
considered by the court 
to be a very close issue. 
It concluded, however, 
that while the time frame 
did not appear to be the 
best choice, there was 
justification for it and it 
could not be deemed 
arbitrary and capricious. 
Earth Island Inst. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 351 
F.3d 1291 (2003) 
A challenge to salvage 
logging EIS on Eldorado 
National Forest, 
California. Plaintiffs 
challenged that the 
agency should have 
prepared an EIS for 
projects in both Tahoe 
and Eldorado National 
Forests because they 
were both similar and 
planned in response to 
the Star Fire. They 
argued the scale of 
analysis was too small 
and that the Eldorado 
EIS did not adequately 
CEA inadequate 
1) The two projects were 
not necessarily 
cumulative actions. A 
single EIS might have 
made sense but was not 
required because the 
projects were not clearly 
part of a single broader 
proposal. “Similar” 
actions may be analyzed 
in a single EIS, but this 
is not required. 
2) The CEA failed to 
analyze how actions on 
the Eldorado would 
affect a “protected 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
consider cumulative 
impacts resulting from 
actions on the Tahoe 
National Forest, which 
was also affected by the 
fire and was planning a 
nearby sale of a similar 
nature. 
activity center” for 
California spotted owls 
in the Tahoe National 
Forest. The area under 
question in the Eldorado 
was acknowledged as 
relevant habitat for the 
Tahoe protected activity 
center prior to this EIS. 
The Eldorado National 
Forest erroneously 
concluded that the Tahoe 
National Forest would 
delist this PAC. The 
court held that the 
agency should have 
foreseen that such 
delisting would not occur 
and should have 
analyzed cumulative 
impacts on the owl. 
Cold Mountain v. 
Garber, 375 F.3d 884 
(2004) 
A challenge to an EA for 
a bison herding facility 
on the Gallatin National 
Forest, Montana that the 
agency failed to 
adequately analyze 
cumulative impacts and 
should have prepared an 
EIS. 
CEA adequate 
The court held that the 
agency clearly analyzed 
cumulative effects and 
justified its decision not 
to prepare an EIS. 
Plaintiffs failed to 
highlight a deficiency in 
the NEPA process. 
Lands Council v. 
Powell, 379 F.3d 738 
(2004), amended at 
395 F.3d 1019 (2005) 
A challenge to the Iron 
Honey timber 
harvest/watershed 
management project on 
the Idaho Panhandle 
National Forest, Idaho. 
Plaintiffs challenged the 
lack of specificity and 
detail in analysis of prior 
timber harvests in area 
and failure to include 
foreseeable future 
projects in analysis. They 
also argued the data used 
for CEA for Westslope 
Cutthroat Trout were 
CEA inadequate 
1) The EIS failed to 
provide discussion of the 
effects from individual 
past harvests and offered 
only a vague discussion 
of overall environmental 
effects. A cataloging of 
past projects with 
detailed information on 
effects is the minimum 
necessary for a CEA; it 
is also crucial for a 
useful alternatives 
analysis. 
2) Only proposed or 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
outdated and unreliable, 
rendering the CEA 
inadequate. 
scoped future projects 
must be included in a 
CEA. The analysis was 
deemed adequate on the 
issue of future projects. 
3) Trout habitat data was 
nearly fifteen years old 
and was deemed too stale 
to suffice for a CEA. 
High Sierra Hikers 
Ass’n v. Blackwell, 
381 F.3d 886 (2004), 
amended at 390 F.3d 
630 (2004) 
Plaintiffs contended that 
the USFS needs to 
complete an EIS to 
assess the cumulative 
impacts of issuing multi-
year special use permits 
to outfitters in two 
wilderness areas on the 
Inyo and Sierra National 
Forests, California. 
CEA inadequate 
The court ruled that an 
EIS with a CEA was 
necessary. The agency 
acknowledged a CEA 
had not been done and 
said that it would comply 
with NEPA when it 
issued future permit 
renewals. The court 
responded that NEPA 
analysis is required prior 
to agency actions. 
NRDC v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 421 F.3d 797 
(2005) 
Plaintiffs challenged the 
CEA in the EIS for the 
forest plan for the 
Tongass National Forest, 
Alaska, arguing the EIS 
failed to examine CEA 
with regard to past and 
reasonably foreseeable 
future nonfederal logging 
on adjacent lands. 
 
CEA in EIS ruled 
inadequate 
1) Over five percent of 
the forest is owned by 
nonfederal entities and 
these areas had been 
heavily developed. The 
court ruled that the 
agency must consider the 
cumulative impacts of 
this logging and do so in 
the plan because the 
CEA could significantly 
affect how the agency 
plans to protect other 
resources. 
2) The court made it 
clear that a plan level 
EIS always must include 
a CEA (citing Resources 
Ltd. v. Robertson, 35 
F.3d 1300 (1993)). In 
that case the court 
allowed the agency to 
defer analysis of the 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
effects of actions on 
private land until the 
project level. In this case 
the court decides that the 
plan was the appropriate 
time to analyze activities 
on private lands. 
3) The court cited Lands 
Council v. Powell and 
reiterated that a 
cataloging of past, 
present, and reasonably 
foreseeable actions and 
an analysis of their 
environmental effects is 
required at a minimum 
for a CEA. 
Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. 
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
451 F.3d 1005 (2006) 
A challenge to a timber 
sale EA on the Klamath 
National Forest, 
California, arguing that 
an EIS should have been 
prepared because of 
possible significant 
effects. Plaintiffs also 
argued the CEA for 
water quality was flawed 
and the CEA was 
inadequate because of 
failure to included a 
reasonably foreseeable 
future sale. 
CEA adequate 
1) The court found that 
the agency analyzed 
cumulative impacts to 
the watershed using a 
model that analyzed 
effects on the project and 
watershed scales and 
included past, present, 
and foreseeable future 
impacts. The plaintiffs 
did not challenge the 
validity of the model. 
The court concluded that 
the CEA was sufficiently 
detailed and quantified to 
meet NEPA 
requirements. 
2) The parameters of the 
future sale were not 
developed enough to 
allow for a useful CEA. 
The agency did not act 
arbitrarily in choosing to 
exclude it. Even if the 
agency made an error of 
judgment in excluding 
the sale from the CEA, it 
remedied this by 
providing some 
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discussion of cumulative 
impacts in its response to 
public comments. 
Oregon Natural Res. 
Council Fund v. 
Goodman, 505 F.3d 
884 (2007) 
A challenge to EIS for 
expansion of Mt. 
Ashland Ski Area, Rogue 
River National Forest, 
Oregon, that the agency 
failed to include two 
future projects in the 
CEA for the pacific 
fisher. Plaintiffs also 
argued the agency erred 
in its use of a watershed 
impact model to assess 
cumulative impacts. 
CEA inadequate 
1) The agency failed to 
provide any specific 
analysis of potential 
cumulative impacts on 
fisher resulting from this 
and two other scheduled 
future projects. The EIS 
concluded there would 
be no significant impacts 
on the fisher but failed to 
justify these statements 
with any supporting 
information. 
Furthermore, the agency 
could not justify this 
conclusion with the 
explanation that a CEA 
was not necessary 
because the anticipated 
effects of the ski area 
would be small. The 
agency must put effects 
in context in light of the 
broader landscape—this 
is precisely what a CEA 
is for. 
2) Agency’s watershed 
model was sufficiently 
quantified and detailed to 
satisfy NEPA’s CEA 
requirement. 
Sierra Club v. 
Bosworth, 510 F.3d 
1016 (2007) 
A challenge to CatEx 
category 10, the “Fuels 
Catex.” Plaintiffs argued 
the agency failed to 
establish that 
promulgation of the 
CatEx category would 
have no significant 
cumulative impacts. 
Promulgation of CatEx 
category without a CEA 
in violation of NEPA 
1) A CEA is not required 
as part of an EA or EIS 
for the creation of a 
CatEx category, but is 
required nonetheless as 
part of the process. 
2) The USFS conceded 
that no CEA was 
performed before 
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Ninth Circuit Cases CEA-related challenges Court decision 
promulgation of the 
category. The court held 
that the USFS must 
ensure that the category 
would not have 
significant cumulative 
impacts. If this was not 
possible, then it should 
not have promulgated the 
rule. 
3) Agency reports 
indicated potentially 
significant effects from 
similar projects on 
various resources but 
concluded there would 
be no significant 
cumulative impacts, 
without justification. The 
court would not accept 
general statements about 
risk or unsupported 
conclusions of no 
significant cumulative 
impacts. 
Wild West Inst. v. Bull, 
547 F.3d 1162 (2008) 
Plaintiffs challenged the 
Middle East Fork Project 
on the Bitterroot 
National Forest. They 
contended that the 
agency had 
inappropriately excluded 
external scientific 
analysis on soil quality 
impacts. Plaintiffs also 
brought a challenge that 
the agency did not 
properly consider 
cumulative impacts in 
light of its obligations 
under NFMA. 
CEA adequate 
The court ruled for the 
agency on all counts. On 
the NEPA challenge, the 
court found that the 
agency had properly 
included the external 
scientific findings in its 
discussion of cumulative 
impacts to soil quality. 
League of Wilderness 
Defenders v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 549 F.3d 
1211 (2008) 
A challenge to the CEA 
for the Deep Creek 
Vegetation Management 
Project on the Ochoco 
National Forest, Oregon. 
CEA inadequate 
1) The court found that 
considering cumulative 
impacts in the aggregate 
was permissible, based 
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The Forest Service had 
considered aggregate 
cumulative impacts of 
past actions, rather than 
impacts of individual 
past actions, failed to 
consider past and future 
timber sales in its 
analysis, and had not 
adequately considered 
cumulative impacts from 
grazing. 
on guidance from CEQ. 
2) However, the agency 
failed to adequately 
consider past timber 
sales in its analysis. 
Furthermore, the agency 
improperly tried to tier to 
a non-NEPA document 
(a Watershed Analysis). 
3) The court supported 
the agencies analysis of 
future projects and 
grazing activities. 
Ecology Ctr. v. 
Castaneda, 574 F.3d 
652 (2009) 
A challenge to nine 
timber sale projects on 
the Kootenai National 
Forest, Montana. 
Plaintiffs argued the 
agency’s CEA was 
inadequate for failure to 
discuss effects of past 
projects on an individual 
basis. 
CEA adequate 
1) The court upheld the 
agency’s analysis, 
finding adequate 
discussion of past 
projects. 
2) The court reiterated 
that “an aggregated 
[CEA] that includes 
relevant past projects is 
sufficient.”305 
 
 
305 574 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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Holdings 
Tenth Circuit 
Cases 
CEA-related 
challenges Court decision 
Colo. Wild v. U.S. 
Forest Serv., 435 
F.3d 1204 (2006) 
A facial and applied 
challenge to CatEx 
category 13 as applied 
to Shaw Lake 
vegetation 
management project on 
Rio Grande National 
Forest, Colorado. 
Plaintiffs argued the 
use of the category 
would lead to 
cumulative impacts. 
1) The court ruled that the 
agency’s process was 
adequate. 
2) Scoping, the illegality of 
segmenting a project, and the 
extraordinary circumstances 
requirement, according to the 
court, serve as safety valves 
when it comes to cumulative 
impacts.  
Utah Envtl. 
Congress v. 
Bosworth, 443 F.3d 
732 (2006) 
An applied challenge 
to a CatEx of Seven 
Mile Spruce Beetle 
Management Project 
on the Fishlake 
National Forest, Utah. 
Plaintiffs argued the 
project should not have 
been approved under 
the CatEx because of 
the lack of a 
preliminary analysis to 
determine that the 
project would not have 
cumulative effects, 
because the agency 
failed to analyze 
cumulative impacts on 
management indicator 
species and sensitive 
species, and because it 
failed to delineate an 
appropriate CEA area 
beyond the project 
area. They also argued 
extraordinary 
circumstances should 
have precluded use of 
CatEx. 
 
 
1) The court stated that the 
requirement to perform a 
CEA would render the use of 
categorical exclusions useless. 
The agency already 
determined that the category 
would not have significant 
cumulative effects as part of 
the creation of the CatEx 
category, which the plaintiffs 
did not challenge. 
2) An agency only needs to 
perform a CEA if 
“extraordinary circumstances” 
are present that preclude use 
of a CatEx. The court found 
that no significant 
extraordinary circumstances 
existed, and therefore the use 
of the CatEx was justified.  
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Tenth Circuit 
Cases 
CEA-related 
challenges Court decision 
Utah Envtl. 
Congress v. 
Richmond, 483 
F.3d 1127 (2007) 
A challenge to EIS for 
Trout Slope West 
project on the Ashley 
National Forest, Utah 
that the agency failed 
to adequately analyze 
the nature of 
cumulative effects and 
only provided 
description. Plaintiffs 
argued the agency 
described negative 
effects but did not 
provide a useful CEA. 
 
1) The court ruled that the 
agency adequately analyzed 
cumulative effects, providing 
sufficient information and 
detail and including analysis 
of relevant past projects in 
conjunction with the current 
project. 
2) Plaintiffs disagreed with 
conclusions of the agency but 
offered no evidence why the 
analysis was inaccurate or 
violated NEPA. 
 
 
 
